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Abstract—Weconsideracognitiveradio(CR)networkconsisting 5
of a secondary transmitter (ST), a secondary destination (SD) and 6
multiplesecondaryrelays(SRs)inthepresenceofaneavesdropper, 7
where the ST transmits to the SD with the assistance of SRs, while 8
theeavesdropperattemptstointerceptthesecondarytransmission. 9
We rely on careful relay selection for protecting the ST-SD trans- 10
mission against the eavesdropper with the aid of both single-relay 11
and multi-relay selection. To be speciﬁc, only the “best” SR is cho- 12
sen in the single-relay selection for assisting the secondary trans- 13
mission, whereas the multi-relay selection invokes multiple SRs for 14
simultaneously forwarding the ST’s transmission to the SD. We 15
analyze both the intercept probability and outage probability of 16
the proposed single-relay and multi-relay selection schemes for the 17
secondary transmission relying on realistic spectrum sensing. We 18
also evaluate the performance of classic direct transmission and 19
artiﬁcial noise based methods for the purpose of comparison with 20
the proposed relay selection schemes. It is shown that as the inter- 21
cept probability requirement is relaxed, the outage performance of 22
the direct transmission, the artiﬁcial noise based and the relay se- 23
lection schemes improves, and vice versa. This implies a trade-off 24
between the security and reliability of the secondary transmission 25
in the presence of eavesdropping attacks, which is referred to as 26
the security-reliability trade-off (SRT). Furthermore, we demon- 27
strate that the SRTs of the single-relay and multi-relay selection 28
schemes are generally better than that of classic direct trans- 29
mission, explicitly demonstrating the advantage of the proposed 30
relay selection in terms of protecting the secondary transmissions 31
against eavesdropping attacks. Moreover, as the number of SRs 32
increases, the SRTs of the proposed single-relay and multi-relay 33
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selection approaches signiﬁcantly improve. Finally, our numerical 34
results show that as expected, the multi-relay selection scheme 35
achieves a better SRT performance than the single-relay selection. 36
Index Terms—Security-reliability trade-off, relay selection, 37
intercept probability, outage probability, eavesdropping attack, 38
cognitive radio. 39
I. INTRODUCTION 40
T
HE security aspects of cognitive radio (CR) systems [1]– 41
[3] have attracted increasing attention from the research 42
community. Indeed, due to the highly dynamic nature of the CR 43
network architecture, legitimate CR devices become exposed 44
to both internal as well as to external attackers and hence they 45
are extremely vulnerable to malicious behavior. For example, 46
an illegitimate user may intentionally impose interference (i.e. 47
jamming) for the sake of artiﬁcially contaminating the CR envi- 48
ronment [4]. Hence, the CR users fail to accurately characterize 49
their surrounding radio environment and may become misled 50
or compromised, which leads to a malfunction. Alternatively, 51
an illegitimate user may attempt to tap the communications of 52
authorized CR users by eavesdropping, to intercept conﬁdential 53
information. 54
Clearly, CR networks face diverse security threats during 55
both spectrum sensing [5], [6] as well as spectrum sharing [7], 56
spectrum mobility [8] and spectrum management [9]. Extensive 57
studies have been carried out for protecting CR networks both 58
against primary user emulation (PUE) [10] and against denial- 59
of-service (DoS) attacks [11]. In addition to PUE and DoS at- 60
tacks, eavesdropping is another main concern in protecting the 61
data conﬁdentiality [12], although it has received less attention 62
in the literature on CR network security. Traditionally, crypto- 63
graphic techniques are employed for guaranteeing transmission 64
conﬁdentiality against an eavesdropping attack. However, this 65
introduces a signiﬁcant computational overhead [13] as well as 66
imposing additional system complexity in terms of the secret 67
key management [14]. Furthermore, the existing cryptographic 68
approaches are not perfectly secure and can still be decrypted 69
byaneavesdropper(E),providedthatithasthecapacitytocarry 70
outexhaustivekeysearchwiththeaidofbrute-forceattack[15]. 71
Physical-layer security [16], [17] is emerging as an efﬁcient 72
approach for defending authorized users against eavesdropping 73
attacks by exploiting the physical characteristics of wireless 74
channels. In [17], Leung-Yan-Cheong and Hellman demon- 75
strated that perfectly secure and reliable transmission can be 76
achieved, when the wiretap channel spanning from the source 77
to the eavesdropper is a further degraded version of the main 78
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channel between the source and destination. They also showed 79
that the maximal secrecy rate achieved at the legitimate desti- 80
nation, which is termed the secrecy capacity, is the difference 81
between the capacity of the main channel and that of the 82
wiretap channel. In [18]–[20], the secrecy capacity limits of 83
wireless fading channels were further developed and character- 84
ized from an information-theoretic perspective, demonstrating 85
the detrimental impact of wireless fading on the physical- 86
layer security. To combat the fading effects, both multiple-input 87
multiple-output (MIMO) schemes [21], [22] as well as coop- 88
erative relaying [23]–[25] and beamforming techniques [26], 89
[27] were investigated for the sake of enhancing the achievable 90
wireless secrecy capacity. Although extensive research efforts 91
were devoted to improving the security of traditional wireless 92
networks [16]–[27], less attention has been dedicated to CR 93
networks. In [28] and [29], the achievable secrecy rate of 94
the secondary transmission was investigated under a speciﬁc 95
quality-of-service (QoS) constraint imposed on the primary 96
transmission. Additionally, an overview of the physical-layer 97
security aspects of CR networks was provided in [30], where 98
several security attacks as well as the related countermeasures 99
are discussed. In contrast to conventional non-cognitive wire- 100
less networks, the physical-layer security of CR networks has to 101
consider diverse additional challenges, including the protection 102
of the primary user’s QoS and the mitigation of the mutual 103
interference between the primary and secondary transmissions. 104
Motivated by the above considerations, we explore the 105
physical-layer security of a CR network comprised of a sec- 106
ondary transmitter (ST) communicating with a secondary des- 107
tination (SD) with the aid of multiple secondary relays (SRs) 108
in the presence of an unauthorized attacker. Our main focus 109
is on investigating the security-reliability trade-off (SRT) of 110
the cognitive relay transmission in the presence of realistic 111
spectrum sensing. The notion of the SRT in wireless physical- 112
layer security was introduced and examined in [31], where the 113
security and reliability was characterized in terms of the inter- 114
cept probability and outage probability, respectively. In contrast 115
to the conventional non-cognitive wireless networks studied in 116
[31], the SRT analysis of CR networks presented in this work 117
additionally takes into account the mutual interference between 118
the primary user (PU) and secondary user (SU). 119
The main contributions of this paper are summarized as 120
follows. 121
• We propose two relay selection schemes, namely both 122
single-relay and multi-relay selection, for protecting the 123
secondary transmissions against eavesdropping attacks. 124
More speciﬁcally, in the single-relay selection (SRS) 125
scheme, only a single relay is chosen from the set of mul- 126
tiple SRs for forwarding the secondary transmissions from 127
the ST to the SD. By contrast, the multi-relay selection 128
(MRS) scheme employs multiple SRs for simultaneously 129
assisting the ST-SD transmissions. 130
• We present the mathematical SRT analysis of the proposed 131
SRS and MRS schemes in the presence of realistic spec- 132
trum sensing. Closed-form expressions are derived for the 133
intercept probability (IP) and outage probability (OP) of 134
both schemes for transmission over Rayleigh fading chan- 135
nels. The numerical SRT results of conventional direct 136
Fig. 1. A primary wireless network in coexistence with a secondary CR
network.
transmission and artiﬁcial noise based schemes are also 137
provided for comparison purposes. 138
• It is shown that as the spectrum sensing reliability is 139
increased and/or the false alarm probability is reduced, the 140
SRTs of both the SRS and MRS schemes are improved. 141
Numerical results demonstrate that the proposed SRS and 142
MRS schemes generally outperform the conventional di- 143
rect transmission and artiﬁcial noise based approaches in 144
t e r m so ft h e i rS R T s . 145
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. 146
Section II presents the system model of physical-layer security 147
in CR networks in the context of both the direct transmission as 148
well as the SRS and MRS schemes. In Section III, we analyze 149
the SRTs of these schemes in the presence of realistic spectrum 150
sensing over Rayleigh fading channels. Next, numerical SRT 151
results of the direct transmission, SRS and MRS schemes are 152
given in Section IV, where the SRT performance of the artiﬁcial 153
noise based scheme is also numerically evaluated for com- 154
parison purposes. Finally, Section V provides our concluding 155
remarks. 156
II. RELAY SELECTION AIDED PROTECTION AGAINST 157
EAVESDROPPING IN CR NETWORKS 158
We ﬁrst introduce the overall system model of physical-layer 159
security in CR networks. We then present the signal model of 160
the conventional direct transmission approach, which will serve 161
as our benchmarker, as well as of the SRS and MRS schemes 162
for improving the CR system’s security against eavesdropping 163
attacks. 164
A. System Model 165
As shown in Fig. 1, we consider a primary network in 166
coexistence with a secondary network (also referred to as a CR 167
network). The primary network includes a primary base station 168
(PBS) and multiple primary users (PUs), which communicate 169
with the PBS over the licensed spectrum. By contrast, the 170
secondary network consisting of one or more STs and SDs 171
exploits the licensed spectrum in an opportunistic way. To 172IEEE
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be speciﬁc, a particular ST should ﬁrst detect with the aid 173
of spectrum sensing whether or not the licensed spectrum is 174
occupied by the PBS. If so, the ST is not at liberty to transmit 175
to avoid interfering with the PUs. If alternatively, the licensed 176
spectrum is deemed to be unoccupied (i.e. a spectrum hole 177
is detected), then the ST may transmit to the SD over the 178
detected spectrum hole. Meanwhile, E attempts to intercept the 179
secondary transmission from the ST to the SD. For notational 180
convenience, let H0 and H1 represent the event that the licensed 181
spectrum is unoccupied and occupied by the PBS during a 182
particular time slot, respectively. Moreover, let ˆ H denote the 183
status of the licensed spectrum detected by spectrum sensing. 184
Speciﬁcally, ˆ H = H0 represents the case that the licensed 185
spectrum is deemed to be unoccupied, while ˆ H = H1 indicates 186
that the licensed spectrum is deemed to be occupied. 187
The probability Pd of correct detection of the presence of 188
PBS and the associated false alarm probability Pf are deﬁned 189
as Pd = Pr( ˆ H = H1|H1) and Pf = Pr( ˆ H = H1|H0), respectively. 190
Due to the background noise and fading effects, it is impossible 191
to achieve perfectly reliable spectrum sensing without missing 192
the detection of an active PU and without false alarm, which 193
suggests that a spectral band is occupied by a PU, when it 194
is actually unoccupied. Moreover, the missed detection of the 195
presence of PBS will result in interference between the PU 196
and SU. To guarantee that the interference imposed on the 197
PUs is below a tolerable level, both the successful detection 198
probability (SDP) Pd and false alarm probability (FAP) Pf 199
should be within a meaningful target range. For example, the 200
IEEE 802.22 standard requires Pd > 0.9 and Pf < 0.1 [2]. For 201
better protection of PUs, we consider Pd = 0.99 and Pf = 0.01, 202
unless otherwise stated. Additionally, we consider a Rayleigh 203
fading model for characterizing all the channels between any 204
twonodes ofFig.1.Finally,allthereceived signalsareassumed 205
to be corrupted by additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) 206
having a zero mean and a variance of N0. 207
B. Direct Transmission 208
Let us ﬁrst consider the conventional direct transmission 209
as a benchmark scheme. Let xp and xs denote the random 210
symbols transmitted by the PBS and the ST at a particular 211
time instance. Without loss of generality, we assume E[|xp|2]= 212
E[|xs|2]=1, where E[·] represents the expected value operator. 213
The transmit powers of the PBS and ST are denoted by Pp and 214
Ps, respectively. Given that the licensed spectrum is deemed to 215
be unoccupied by the PBS (i.e. ˆ H =H0), ST transmits its signal 216
xs at a power of Ps. Then, the signal received at the SD can be 217
written as 218
yd = hsd
√
Psxs+hpd
 
αPpxp+nd, (1)
where hsd and hpd represent the fading coefﬁcients of the 219
channel spanning from ST to SD and that from PBS to SD, 220
respectively. Furthermore, nd represents the AWGN received at 221
SD and the random variable (RV) α is deﬁned as 222
α =
 
0, H0
1, H1, (2)
where H0 represents that the licensed spectrum is unoccupied 223
by PBS and no primary signal is transmitted, leading to α = 0. 224
By contrast, H1 represents that PBS is transmitting its signal xp 225
over the licensed spectrum, thus α = 1. Meanwhile, due to the 226
broadcast nature of the wireless medium, the ST’s signal will 227
be overheard by E and the overheard signal can be expressed as 228
ye = hse
√
Psxs+hpe
 
αPpxp+ne, (3)
where hse and hpe represent the fading coefﬁcients of the 229
channel spanning from ST to E and that from PBS to E, 230
respectively, while ne represents the AWGN received at E. 231
Upon combining Shannon’s capacity formula [31] with (1), we 232
obtain the capacity of the ST-SD channel as 233
Csd = log2
 
1+
|hsd|2γs
α|hpd|2γp+1
 
, (4)
where γs =Ps/N0 and γp =Pp/N0. Similarly, the capacity of the 234
ST-E channel is obtained from (3) as 235
Cse = log2
 
1+
|hse|2γs
α|hpe|2γp+1
 
. (5)
C. Single-Relay Selection 236
In this subsection, we consider the cognitive relay network 237
of Fig. 2, where both SD and E are assumed to be beyond 238
the coverage area of the ST [24], [25], and N secondary 239
relays (SRs) are employed for assisting the cognitive ST-SD 240
transmission.Weassumethatacommon controlchannel (CCC) 241
[6] is available for coordinating the actions of the different 242
network nodes and the decode-and-forward (DF) relaying using 243
two adjacent time slots is employed. More speciﬁcally, once 244
the licensed spectrum is deemed to be unoccupied, the ST ﬁrst 245
broadcasts its signal xs to the N SRs, which attempt to decode 246
xs from their received signals. For notational convenience, let 247
D represent the set of SRs that succeed in decoding xs.G i v e n248
N SRs, there are 2N possible subsets D, thus the sample space 249
of D is formulated as 250
Ω = {/ 0,D1,D2,···,Dn,···,D2N−1}, (6)
where / 0 represents the empty set and Dn represents the n-th 251
non-empty subset of the N SRs. If the set D is empty, implying 252
that no SR decodes xs successfully, then all the SRs remain 253
silent and thus both SD and E are unable to decode xs in this 254
case. If the set D is non-empty, a speciﬁc SR is chosen from 255
D to forward its decoded signal xs to SD. Therefore, given 256
ˆ H = H0 (i.e. the licensed spectrum is deemed unoccupied), ST 257
broadcasts its signal xs to N SRs at a power of Ps a n dar a t eo f258
R. Hence, the signal received at a speciﬁc SRi is given by 259
yi = hsi
√
Psxs+hpi
 
αPpxp+ni, (7)
where hsi and hpi represent the fading coefﬁcients of the ST-SRi 260
channel and that of the PBS-SRi channel, respectively, with 261IEEE
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ni representing the AWGN at SRi. From (7), we obtain the 262
capacity of the ST-SRi channel as 263
Csi =
1
2
log2
 
1+
|hsi|2γs
α|hpi|2γp+1
 
, (8)
where the factor 1
2 arises from the fact that two orthogonal time 264
slotsarerequiredforcompletingthemessagetransmissionfrom 265
ST to SD via SRi. According to Shannon’s coding theorem, 266
if the data rate is higher than the channel capacity, the re- 267
ceiver becomes unable to successfully decode the source signal, 268
regardless of the decoding algorithm adopted. Otherwise, the 269
receiver can succeed in decoding the source signal. Thus, using 270
(8), we can describe the event of D = / 0 as 271
Csi < R, i ∈{ 1,2,···,N}. (9)
Meanwhile, the event of D =Dn is described as 272
Csi > R, i ∈Dn
Csj< R, j ∈ ¯ Dn, (10)
where ¯ Dn represents the complementary set of Dn. Without 273
loss of generality, we assume that SRi is chosen within Dn to 274
transmit its decoded result xs at a power of Ps, thus the signal 275
received at SD can be written as 276
yd = hid
√
Psxs+hpd
 
αPpxp+nd, (11)
where hid represents the fading coefﬁcient of the SRi − SD 277
channel. From (11), the capacity of the SRi −SD channel is 278
given by 279
Cid =
1
2
log2
 
1+
|hid|2γs
α|hpd|2γp+1
 
, (12)
where i ∈ Dn. In general, the speciﬁc SRi having the highest 280
instantaneous capacity to SD is chosen as the “best” SR for as- 281
sisting the ST’s transmission. Therefore, the best relay selection 282
criterion is expressed from (12) as 283
Best SR = argmax
i∈Dn
Cid = argmax
i∈Dn
|hid|2, (13)
whichshowsthatonlythechannelstateinformation(CSI)|hid|2 284
is required for performing the relay selection without the need 285
for the eavesdropper’s CSI knowledge. Upon combining (12) 286
and (13), we obtain the capacity of the channel spanning from 287
the “best” SR to SD as 288
Cbd =
1
2
log2
 
1+
γs
α|hpd|2γp+1
max
i∈Dn
|hid|2
 
, (14)
wherethesubscript‘b’inCbd denotesthebestSR.Itisobserved 289
from (14) that the legitimate transmission capacity of the SRS 290
scheme is determined by the maximum of independent random 291
variables (RVs) |hid|2 for different SRs. By contrast, one can 292
see from (4) that the capacity of classic direct transmission is 293
affected by the single RV |hsd|2.I fa l lR V s|hid|2 and |hsd|2 are 294
independent and identically distributed (i.i.d), it would be most 295
likelythat max
i∈Dn
|hid|2 ismuch higher than|hsd|2 forasufﬁciently 296
Fig. 2. A cognitive relay network consists of one ST, one SD and N SRs in
t h ep r e s e n c eo fa nE .
large number of SRs, resulting in a performance improvement 297
for the SRS scheme over the classic direct transmission. How- 298
ever, if the RVs |hid|2 and |hsd|2 are non-identically distributed 299
and the mean value of |hsd|2 is much higher than that of |hid|2, 300
then it may be more likely that max
i∈Dn
|hid|2 is smaller than |hsd|2 301
for a given number of SRs. In this extreme case, the classic 302
direct transmission may perform better than the SRS scheme. 303
It is worth mentioning that in practice, the average fading gain 304
of the SRi −SD channel, |hid|2, should not be less than that 305
of the ST-SD channel |hsd|2, since SRs are typically placed 306
in the middle between the ST and SD. Hence, a performance 307
improvement for the SRS scheme over classic direct transmis- 308
sion would be achieved in practical wireless systems. Note 309
that although a factor 1/2 in (14) is imposed on the capacity 310
of the main channel, it would not affect the performance of 311
the SRS scheme from a SRT perspective, since the capacity 312
of the wiretap channel is also multiplied by 1/2 as will be 313
shown in (16). 314
Additionally, given that the selected SR transmits its 315
decoded result xs at a power of Ps, the signal received at E is 316
expressed as 317
ye = hbe
√
Psxs+hpe
 
αPpxp+ne, (15)
where hbe and hpe represent the fading coefﬁcients of the chan- 318
nel from “best” SR to E and that from PBS to E, respectively. 319
From (15), the capacity of the channel spanning from the “best” 320
SR to E is given by 321
Cbe =
1
2
log2
 
1+
|hbe|2γs
α|hpe|2γp+1
 
, (16)
where b ∈ Dn is determined by the relay selection criterion 322
given in (13). As shown in (16), the eavesdropper’s channel 323
capacity is affected by the channel state information (CSI) 324
|hbe|2 of the wiretap channel spanning from the “best” relay to 325
the eavesdropper. However, one can see from (13) that the best 326
relay is selected from the decoding set Dn solely based on the 327
main channel’s CSI |hid|2 i.e. without taking into account the 328
eavesdropper’s CSI knowledge of |hie|2. This means that the 329
selection of the best relay aiming for maximizing the legitimate 330
transmission capacity of (14) would not lead to signiﬁcantly 331IEEE
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beneﬁcial or adverse impact on the eavesdropper’s channel 332
capacity, since the main channel and the wiretap channel are 333
independent of each other. 334
For example, if the random variables (RVs) |hie|2 related to 335
the different relays are i.i.d, we can readily infer by the law 336
of total probability that |hbe|2 has the same probability den- 337
sity function (PDF) as |hie|2, implying that the eavesdropper’s 338
channel capacity of (16) is not affected by the selection of the 339
best relay given by (13). Therefore, the SRS scheme has no 340
obvious advantage over the classic direct transmission in terms 341
of minimizing the capacity of the wiretap channel. To elaborate 342
a little further, according to the SRT trade-off, a reduction of 343
the outage probability (OP) due to the capacity enhancement 344
of the main channel achieved by using the selection of the 345
best relay would be converted into an intercept probability 346
(IP) improvement, which will be numerically illustrated in 347
Section IV. 348
D. Multi-Relay Selection 349
This subsection presents a MRS scheme, where multiple SRs 350
are employed for simultaneously forwarding the source signal 351
xs to SD. To be speciﬁc, ST ﬁrst transmits xs to N SRs over a 352
detected spectrum hole. As mentioned in Subsection II-C, we 353
denote by D the set of SRs that successfully decode xs.I fD 354
is empty, all SRs fail to decode xs and will not forward the 355
source signal, thus both SD and E are unable to decode xs.I f 356
D is non-empty (i.e. D = Dn), all SRs within Dn are utilized 357
for simultaneously transmitting xs to SD. This differs from the 358
SRS scheme, where only a single SR is chosen from Dn for 359
forwarding xs to SD. To make effective use of multiple SRs, a 360
weight vector denoted by w =[ w1,w2,···,w|Dn|]T is employed 361
at the SRs for transmitting xs, where |Dn| is the cardinality of 362
the set Dn. For the sake of a fair comparison with the SRS 363
schemeintermsofpowerconsumption,thetotaltransmitpower 364
across all SRs within Dn shall be constrained to Ps and thus the 365
weight vector w should be normalized according to  w  = 1. 366
Thus, given D =Dn and considering that all SRs within Dn are 367
selected for simultaneously transmitting xs with a weight vector 368
w, the signal received at SD is expressed as 369
ymulti
d =
√
PswTHdxs+
 
αPphpdxp+nd, (17)
whereHd =[h1d,h2d,···,h|Dn|d]T.Similarly,thesignalreceived 370
at E can be written as 371
ymulti
e =
√
PswTHexs+
 
αPphpexp+ne, (18)
where He =[ h1e,h2e,···,h|Dn|e]T. From (17) and (18), the 372
signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratios (SINRs) at SD and E 373
are, respectively, given by 374
SINRmulti
d =
γs
α|hpd|2γp+1
|wTHd|
2
, (19)
and 375
SINRmulti
e =
γs
α|hpe|2γp+1
|wTHe|
2
. (20)
In this work, the weight vector w is optimized by maximizing 376
the SINR at SD, yielding 377
max
w
SINRmulti
d , s.t.  w  = 1, (21)
where the constraint is used for normalization purposes. Using 378
the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality [32], we can readily obtain the 379
optimal weight vector wopt from (21) as 380
wopt =
H∗
d
|Hd|
, (22)
which indicates that the optimal vector design only requires the 381
SR-SD CSI Hd, whilst dispensing with the eavesdropper’s CSI 382
He. Substituting the optimal vector wopt from (22) into (19) and 383
(20) and using Shannon’s capacity formula, we can obtain the 384
channel capacities achieved at both SD and E as 385
Cmulti
d =
1
2
log2
 
1+
γs
αγp|hpd|2+1 ∑
i∈Dn
|hid|2
 
, (23)
and 386
Cmulti
e =
1
2
log2
 
1+
γs
αγp|hpe|2+1
   HH
d He
   2
|Hd|2
 
, (24)
for D = Dn, where H represents the Hermitian transpose. One 387
can observe from (14) and (23) that the difference between the 388
capacity expressions Cbd and Cmulti
d only lies in the fact that 389
the maximum of RVs |hid|2 for different SRs (i.e., max
i∈Dn
|hid|2) 390
is used for the SRS scheme, while the sum of RVs |hid|2 391
(i.e., ∑
i∈Dn
|hid|2) is employed for the MRS scheme. Clearly, 392
we have ∑
i∈Dn
|hid|2 > max
i∈Dn
|hid|2, resulting in a performance 393
gain for MRS over SRS in terms of maximizing the legitimate 394
transmission capacity. Moreover, since the main channel Hd 395
and the wiretap channel He are independent of each other, the 396
optimal weights assigned for the multiple relays based on Hd 397
will only slightly affect the eavesdropper’s channel capacity. 398
This means that the MRS and SRS schemes achieve more or 399
less the same performance in terms of the capacity of the wire- 400
tap channel. Nevertheless, given a ﬁxed outage requirement, 401
the MRS scheme can achieve a better intercept performance 402
than the SRS scheme, because according to the SRT, an outage 403
reduction achieved by the capacity enhancement of the legiti- 404
mate transmission relying on the MRS would be converted into 405
an intercept improvement. To be speciﬁc, given an enhanced 406
capacity of the legitimate transmission, we may increase the 407
data rate R based on the OP deﬁnition of (25) for maintaining 408
a ﬁxed OP, which, in turn leads to a reduction of the IP, since a 409
higher data rate would result in a lower IP, according to the IP 410
deﬁnition of (26). 411
It needs to be pointed out that in the MRS scheme, a 412
high-complexity symbol-level synchronization is required for 413
multiple distributed SRs, when simultaneously transmitting to 414
SD, whereas the SRS does not require such a complex synchro- 415
nization process. Thus, the performance improvement of MRS 416
over SRS is achieved at the cost of a higher implementation 417IEEE
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complexity. Additionally, the synchronization imperfections of 418
theMRSschemewillimposeaperformancedegradation,which 419
may even lead to a performance for the MRS scheme becoming 420
worse than that of the SRS scheme. 421
Throughout this paper, the Rayleigh model is used for char- 422
acterizing the fading amplitudes (e.g., |hsd|, |hsi|, |hid|, etc.) of 423
wireless channels, which, in turn, implies that the fading square 424
magnitudes |hsd|2, |hsi|2 and |hid|2 are exponentially distributed 425
random variables (RVs). So far, we have completed the presen- 426
tation of the signal model of the direct transmission, of the SRS, 427
and of the MRS schemes for CR networks applications in the 428
presence of eavesdropping attacks. 429
III. SRT ANALYSIS OVER RAYLEIGH FADING CHANNELS 430
This section presents the SRT analysis of the direct transmis- 431
sion, SRS and MRS schemes over Rayleigh fading channels. 432
As discussed in [31], the security and reliability are quantiﬁed 433
in terms of the IP and OP experienced by the eavesdropper and 434
destination, respectively. It is pointed out that in CR networks, 435
ST starts to transmit its signal only when an available spectrum 436
hole is detected. Similarly to [34], the OP and IP are thus 437
calculated under the condition that the licensed spectrum is 438
detected to be unoccupied by the PBS. The following gives the 439
deﬁnition of OP and IP. 440
Deﬁnition 1: Let Cd and Ce represent the channel capacities 441
achieved at the destination and eavesdropper, respectively. The 442
OP and IP are, respectively, deﬁned as 443
Pout = Pr(Cd < R| ˆ H = H0), (25)
and 444
Pint = Pr(Ce > R| ˆ H = H0), (26)
where R is the data rate. 445
A. Direct Transmission 446
Let us ﬁrst analyze the SRT performance of the conventional 447
direct transmission. Given that a spectrum hole has been de- 448
tected, the OP of direct transmission is obtained from (25) as 449
Pdirect
out = Pr(Csd < R| ˆ H = H0), (27)
whereCsd is given by (4). Using the law of total probability, we 450
can rewrite (27) as 451
Pdirect
out =Pr(Csd<R,H0| ˆ H=H0)+Pr(Csd<R,H1| ˆ H=H0), (28)
which can be further expressed as 452
Pdirect
out = Pr(Csd < R|H0, ˆ H = H0)Pr(H0| ˆ H = H0)
+Pr(Csd < R|H1, ˆ H = H0)Pr(H1| ˆ H = H0). (29)
It is shown from (2) that given H0 and H1, the parameter α is 453
obtained as α = 0 and α = 1, respectively. Thus, combining (2) 454
and (4), we have Csd = log2(1+|hsd|2γs) given H0 and Csd = 455
log2
 
1+
|hsd|2γs
|hpd|2γp+1
 
given H1. Substituting this result into (29) 456
yields 457
Pdirect
out = Pr(|hsd|2γs < 2R−1)Pr(H0| ˆ H = H0)
+Pr
 
|hsd|2γs
|hpd|2γp+1
< 2R−1
 
Pr(H1| ˆ H = H0). (30)
Moreover, the terms Pr(H0| ˆ H =H0) and Pr(H1| ˆ H =H0) can be 458
obtained by using Bayes’ theorem as 459
Pr(H0| ˆ H = H0)=
Pr( ˆ H = H0|H0)Pr(H0)
∑
i∈{0,1}
Pr( ˆ H = H0|Hi)Pr(Hi)
=
P0(1−Pf)
P0(1−Pf)+(1−P0)(1−Pd)
Δ = π0, (31)
and 460
Pr(H1| ˆ H = H0)=
(1−P0)(1−Pd)
P0(1−Pf)+(1−P0)(1−Pd)
Δ = π1, (32)
where P0 = Pr(H0) is the probability that the licensed spec- 461
trum band is unoccupied by PBS, while Pd = Pr( ˆ H = H1|H1) 462
and Pf = Pr( ˆ H = H1|H0) are the SDP and FAP, respectively. 463
For notational convenience, we introduce the shorthand π0 = 464
Pr(H0| ˆ H = H0), π1 = Pr(H1| ˆ H = H0) and Δ = 2R−1
γs . Then, 465
using (31) and (32), we rewrite (30) as 466
Pdirect
out =π0Pr
 
|hsd|2<Δ
 
+π1Pr
 
|hsd|2−|hpd|2γpΔ<Δ
 
. (33)
Noting that |hsd|2 and |hpd|2 are independently and exponen- 467
tially distributed RVs with respective means of σ2
sd and σ2
pd, 468
we obtain 469
Pr
 
|hsd|2 < Δ
 
= 1−exp
 
−
Δ
σ2
sd
 
, (34)
and 470
Pr
 
|hsd|2−|hpd|2γpΔ<Δ
 
=1−
σ2
sd
σ2
pdγpΔ+σ2
sd
exp
 
−
Δ
σ2
sd
 
. (35)
Additionally, we observe from (26) that an intercept event 471
occurs, when the capacity of the ST-E channel becomes higher 472
than the data rate. Thus, given that a spectrum hole has been de- 473
tected (i.e. ˆ H = H0), ST starts transmitting its signal to SD and 474
E may overhear the ST-SD transmission. The corresponding IP 475
is given by 476
Pdirect
int = Pr(Cse > R| ˆ H = H0), (36)
which can be further expressed as 477
Pdirect
int = Pr(Cse > R| ˆ H = H0,H0)Pr(H0| ˆ H = H0)
+Pr(Cse > R| ˆ H = H0,H1)Pr(H1| ˆ H = H0)
=π0Pr
 
|hse|2>Δ
 
+π1Pr
 
|hse|2−|hpe|2γpΔ>Δ
 
, (37)IEEE
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where the second equality is obtained by using Cse from (5). 478
Noting that RVs |hse|2 and |hpe|2 are exponentially distributed 479
and independent of each other, we can express the terms 480
Pr(|hse|2 > Δ) and Pr(|hse|2−|hpe|2γpΔ > Δ) as 481
Pr
 
|hse|2 > Δ
 
= exp
 
−
Δ
σ2
se
 
, (38)
and 482
Pr
 
|hse|2−|hpe|2γpΔ > Δ
 
=
σ2
se
σ2
peγpΔ+σ2
se
exp
 
−
Δ
σ2
se
 
, (39)
where σ2
se and σ2
pe are the expected values of RVs |hse|2 and 483
|hpe|2, respectively. 484
B. Single-Relay Selection 485
In this subsection, we present the SRT analysis of the pro- 486
posed SRS scheme. Given ˆ H = H0, the OP of the cognitive 487
transmission relying on SRS is given by 488
P
single
out = Pr(Cbd < R,D = / 0| ˆ H = H0)
+
2N−1
∑
n=1
Pr(Cbd < R,D =Dn| ˆ H = H0), (40)
where Cbd represents the capacity of the channel from the 489
“best” SR to SD. In the case of D = / 0, no SR is chosen to 490
forward the source signal, which leads to Cbd = 0f o rD = / 0. 491
Substituting this result into (40) gives 492
P
single
out = Pr(D = / 0| ˆ H = H0)
+
2N−1
∑
n=1
Pr(Cbd < R,D =Dn| ˆ H = H0). (41)
Using (2), (9), (10), and (14), we can rewrite (41) as (42), 493
shown at the bottom of the page, where Λ = 22R−1
γs . Noting 494
that |hsi|2 and |hpi|2 are independent exponentially distributed 495
random variables with respective means of σ2
si and σ2
pi,w eh a v e496
Pr
 
|hsi|2 < Λ
 
= 1−exp
 
−
Λ
σ2
si
 
, (43)
and 497
Pr
 
|hsi|2<Λ|hpi|2γp+Λ
 
=1−
σ2
si
σ2
piγpΛ+σ2
si
exp
 
−
Λ
σ2
si
 
, (44)
where the terms Pr(|hsi|2 > Λ),P r (|hsj|2 < Λ), and Pr(|hsi|2 > 498
Λ|hpi|2γp + Λ) can be similarly determined in closed-form. 499
Moreover, based on Appendix A, we obtain Pr(max
i∈Dn
|hid|2 < Λ) 500
and Pr(max
i∈Dn
|hid|2 < Λ|hpd|2γp+Λ) as 501
Pr
 
max
i∈Dn
|hid|2 < Λ
 
= ∏
i∈Dn
 
1−exp
 
−
Λ
σ2
id
  
, (45)
and 502
Pr
 
max
i∈Dn
|hid|2 < Λ|hpd|2γp+Λ
 
= 1+
2|Dn|−1
∑
m=1
(−1)| ˜ Dn(m)|exp
⎛
⎝− ∑
i∈ ˜ Dn(m)
Λ
σ2
id
⎞
⎠
×
⎛
⎝1+ ∑
i∈ ˜ Dn(m)
Λγpσ2
pd
σ2
id
⎞
⎠
−1
, (46)
where ˜ Dn(m) represents the m-th non-empty subset of Dn. 503
Additionally, the IP of the SRS scheme can be expressed as 504
P
single
int = Pr(Cbe > R,D = / 0| ˆ H = H0)
+
2N−1
∑
n=1
Pr(Cbe > R,D =Dn| ˆ H = H0), (47)
whereCbe represents the capacity of the channel spanning from 505
the “best” SR to E. Given D = / 0,w eh a v eCbe = 0, since 506
no relay is chosen for forwarding the source signal. Thus, 507
P
single
out =π0
N
∏
i=1
Pr
 
|hsi|2 < Λ
 
+π1
N
∏
i=1
Pr
 
|hsi|2 < Λ|hpi|2γp+Λ
 
+π0
2N−1
∑
n=1 ∏
i∈Dn
Pr
 
|hsi|2 > Λ
 
∏
j∈ ¯ Dn
Pr
 
|hsj|2 < Λ
 
Pr
 
max
i∈Dn
|hid|2 < Λ
 
+π1
2N−1
∑
n=1 ∏
i∈Dn
Pr
 
|hsi|2 > Λ|hpi|2γp+Λ
 
∏
j∈ ¯ Dn
Pr
 
|hsj|2 < Λ|hpj|2γp+Λ
 
×Pr
 
max
i∈Dn
|hid|2 < Λ|hpd|2γp+Λ
 
(42)IEEE
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substituting this result into (47) and using (2), (9), (10), and 508
(16), we arrive at 509
P
single
int =π0
2N−1
∑
n=1 ∏
i∈Dn
Pr
 
|hsi|2 > Λ
 
∏
j∈ ¯ Dn
Pr
 
|hsj|2 < Λ
 
×Pr
 
|hbe|2 > Λ
 
+π1
2N−1
∑
n=1 ∏
i∈Dn
Pr
 
|hsi|2 > Λ|hpi|2γp+Λ
 
× ∏
j∈ ¯ Dn
Pr
 
|hsj|2 < Λ|hpj|2γp+Λ
 
×Pr
 
|hbe|2 > Λ|hpe|2γp+Λ
 
, (48)
where the closed-form expressions of Pr(|hsi|2 > Λ) and 510
Pr(|hsi|2 > Λ|hpi|2γp + Λ) can be readily obtained by using 511
(43) and (44). Using the results in Appendix B, we can express 512
Pr(|hbe|2 > Λ) and Pr(|hbe|2 > Λ|hpe|2γp+Λ) as 513
Pr
 
|hbe|2 > Λ
 
= ∑
i∈Dn
exp
 
−
Λ
σ2
ie
 
×
⎡
⎣1+
2|Dn|−1−1
∑
m=1
(−1)|Cn(m)|
 
1+ ∑
j∈Cn(m)
σ2
id
σ2
jd
 −1⎤
⎦, (49)
and 514
Pr
 
|hbe|2>Λ|hpe|2γp+Λ
 
= ∑
i∈Dn
σ2
ie
σ2
peγpΛ+σ2
ie
exp
 
−
Λ
σ2
ie
 
×
⎡
⎣1+
2|Dn|−1−1
∑
m=1
(−1)|Cn(m)|
 
1+ ∑
j∈Cn(m)
σ2
id
σ2
jd
 −1⎤
⎦, (50)
where Cn(m) represents the m-th non-empty subset of Dn−{i} 515
and ‘−’ represents the set difference. 516
C. Multi-Relay Selection 517
This subsection analyzes the SRT of our MRS scheme for 518
transmission over Rayleigh fading channels. Similarly to (41), 519
the OP in this case is given by 520
Pmulti
out = Pr(D = / 0| ˆ H = H0)
+
2N−1
∑
n=1
Pr
 
Cmulti
d < R,D =Dn| ˆ H = H0
 
. (51)
Using (2), (9), (10) and (23), we can rewrite (51) as (52), shown 521
at the bottom of the page, where the closed-form expressions 522
of Pr(|hsi|2 < Λ),P r (|hsi|2 < Λ|hpi|2γp + Λ),P r (|hsi|2 > Λ), 523
Pr(|hsj|2 < Λ) and Pr(|hsi|2 > Λ|hpi|2γp +Λ) can be readily 524
derived, as shown in (43) and (44). However, it is challenging 525
to obtain the closed-form expressions of Pr( ∑
i∈Dn
|hid|2 <Λ) and 526
Pr( ∑
i∈Dn
|hid|2 < γpΛ|hpd|2+Λ). For simplicity, we assume that 527
the fading coefﬁcients of all SRs-SD channels, i.e. |hid|2 for 528
i ∈{ 1,2,···,N}, are i.i.d. RVs having the same mean (average 529
channel gain) denoted by σ2
d = E(|hid|2). This assumption is 530
widely used in the cooperative relaying literature and it is 531
valid in a statistical sense, provided that all SRs are uniformly 532
distributed over a certain geographical area. Assuming that 533
RVs of |hid|2 for i ∈ Dn are i.i.d., based on Appendix C, 534
we arrive at 535
Pr
 
∑
i∈Dn
|hid|2 < Λ
 
= Γ
 
Λ
σ2
d
,|Dn|
 
, (53)
and 536
Pr
 
∑
i∈Dn
|hid|2 < γpΛ|hpd|2+Λ
 
= Γ
 
Λ
σ2
d
,|Dn|
 
+
 
1−Γ
 
Λσ−2
d +σ−2
pdγ−1
p ,|Dn|
  
 
1+σ2
dσ−2
pdγ−1
p Λ−1
 |Dn| e
1/
 
σ2
pdγp
 
, (54)
where Γ(x,k)=
 x
0
tk−1
Γ(k)e−tdt is known as the incomplete 537
Gamma function [32]. Substituting (53) and (54) into (52) 538
yields a closed-form OP expression for the proposed MRS 539
scheme. 540
Pmulti
out =π0
N
∏
i=1
Pr
 
|hsi|2 < Λ
 
+π1
N
∏
i=1
Pr
 
|hsi|2 < Λ|hpi|2γp+Λ
 
+π0
2N−1
∑
n=1 ∏
i∈Dn
Pr
 
|hsi|2 > Λ
 
∏
j∈ ¯ Dn
Pr
 
|hsj|2 < Λ
 
Pr
 
∑
i∈Dn
|hid|2 < Λ
 
+π1
2N−1
∑
n=1 ∏
i∈Dn
Pr
 
|hsi|2 > Λ|hpi|2γp+Λ
 
∏
j∈ ¯ Dn
Pr
 
|hsj|2 < Λ|hpj|2γp+Λ
 
×Pr
 
∑
i∈Dn
|hid|2 < γpΛ|hpd|2+Λ
 
(52)IEEE
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Next, we present the IP analysis of the MRS scheme. Simi- 541
larly to (48), the IP of the MRS can be obtained from (24) as 542
Pmulti
int =π0
2N−1
∑
n=1 ∏
i∈Dn
Pr
 
|hsi|2 > Λ
 
∏
j∈ ¯ Dn
Pr
 
|hsj|2 < Λ
 
×Pr
    HH
d He
   2
|Hd|2 > Λ
 
+π1
2N−1
∑
n=1 ∏
i∈Dn
Pr
 
|hsi|2 > Λ|hpi|2γp+Λ
 
× ∏
j∈ ¯ Dn
Pr
 
|hsj|2 < Λ|hpj|2γp+Λ
 
×Pr
    HH
d He
   2
|Hd|2 > γpΛ|hpe|2+Λ
 
, (55)
where the closed-form expressions of Pr(|hsi|2 > Λ), 543
Pr(|hsj|2 < Λ),P r (|hsi|2 > Λ|hpi|2γp + Λ) and Pr(|hsj|2 < 544
Λ|hpj|2γp +Λ) may be readily derived by using (43) and (44). 545
However, it is challenging to obtain the closed-form solutions 546
for Pr
 
|HH
d He|2
|Hd|2 > Λ
 
and Pr
 
|HH
d He|2
|Hd|2 > γpΛ|hpe|2+Λ
 
. 547
Although ﬁnding a general closed-form IP expression for the 548
MRS scheme is challenging, we can obtain the numerical IP 549
results with the aid of computer simulations. 550
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS 551
In this section, we present our performance comparisons 552
among the direct transmission, the SRS and MRS schemes 553
in terms of their SRT. To be speciﬁc, the analytic IP versus 554
OP of the three schemes are obtained by plotting (33), (37), 555
(42), (48), (52), and (55). The simulated IP and OP results of 556
the three schemes are also given to verify the correctness of 557
the theoretical SRT analysis. In our computer simulations, the 558
fading amplitudes (e.g., |hsd|, |hsi|, |hid|, etc.) are ﬁrst generated 559
based on the Rayleigh distribution having different variances 560
for different channels. Then, the randomly generated fading 561
amplitudes are substituted into the deﬁnition of an outage (or 562
intercept) event, which would determine whether an outage (or 563
intercept) event occurs or not. By repeatedly achieving this pro- 564
cess, we can calculate the relative frequency of occurrence for 565
an outage (intercept) event, which is the simulated OP (or IP). 566
Additionally, the SDP Pd and FAP Pf are set to Pd = 0.99 567
and Pf = 0.01, unless otherwise stated. The primary signal- 568
to-noise ratio (SNR) of γp = 10 dB and the data rate of 569
R = 1 bit/s/Hz are used in our numerical evaluations. 570
The artiﬁcial noise based method [35], [36] is also consid- 571
ered for the purpose of numerical comparison with the relay 572
selection schemes. To be speciﬁc, in the artiﬁcial noise based 573
scheme, ST directly transmits its signal xs to SD, while N SRs 574
attempt to confuse the eavesdropper by sending an interfering 575
signal (referred to as artiﬁcial noise) that is approximately 576
designed to lie in the null-space of the legitimate main channel. 577
In this way, the artiﬁcial noise will impose interference on the 578
eavesdropper without affecting the SD. For a fair comparison, 579
the total transmit power of the desired signal xs and the artiﬁcial 580
noise are constrained to Ps. Moreover, the equal power alloca- 581
tion method [35] is used in the numerical evaluation. 582
Fig. 3. IP versus OP of the direct transmission, the SRS and the MRS schemes
for different P0 with P0 = 0.8, γs ∈ [0,35 dB], N = 6, σ2
sd = σ2
si = σ2
id = 1,
σ2
se = σ2
ie = 0.1, and σ2
pd = σ2
pe = σ2
pi = 0.2.
Fig. 3 shows the IP versus OP of the direct transmission, 583
as well as the SRS and MRS schemes for P0 = 0.8, where 584
the solid lines and discrete marker symbols represent the an- 585
alytic and simulated results, respectively. It can be seen from 586
Fig. 3 that the IP of the direct transmission, the artiﬁcial noise 587
based as well as of the proposed SRS and MRS schemes all 588
improve upon tolerating a higher OP, implying that a trade-off 589
exists between the IP (security) and the OP (reliability) of CR 590
transmissions. Fig. 3 also shows that both the proposed SRS 591
and MRS schemes outperform the direct transmission and the 592
artiﬁcial noise based approaches in terms of their SRT, showing 593
the advantage of exploiting relay selection against the eaves- 594
dropping attack. Moreover, the SRT performance of the MRS is 595
better than that of the SRS. Although the MRS achieves a better 596
SRT performance than its SRS-aided counterpart, this result 597
is obtained at the cost of a higher implementation complexity, 598
since multiple SRs require high-complexity symbol-level syn- 599
chronizationforsimultaneouslytransmittingtotheSD,whereas 600
the SRS does not require such elaborate synchronization. 601
Fig. 4 illustrates our numerical SRT comparison between the 602
SRS and MRS schemes for P0 = 0.2 and P0 = 0.8. Observe 603
from Fig. 4 that the MRS scheme performs better than the SRS 604
in terms of its SRT performance for both P0 =0.2 and P0 =0.8. 605
It is also seen from Fig. 4 that as P0 increases from 0.2 to 606
0.8, the SRT of both the SRS and MRS schemes improves. 607
This is because upon increasing P0, the licensed band becomes 608
unoccupied by the PUs with a higher probability and hence the 609
secondary users (SUs) have more opportunities for accessing 610
the licensed band for their data transmissions, which leads 611
to a reduction of the OP for CR transmissions. Meanwhile, 612
increasing P0 may simultaneously result in an increase of the IP, 613
since the eavesdropper also has more opportunities for tapping 614
the cognitive transmissions. However, in both the SRS and 615
MRS schemes, the relay selection is performed for the sake 616
of maximizing the legitimate transmission capacity without 617
affecting the eavesdropper’s channel capacity. Hence, upon 618
increasing P0, it becomes more likely that the reduction of OP 619
is more signiﬁcant than the increase of IP, hence leading to an 620
overall SRT improvement for the SRS and MRS schemes. 621IEEE
Proof
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Fig. 4. IP versus OP of the SRS and MRS schemes for different P0 with
γs ∈ [0,30 dB], N = 6, σ2
sd = σ2
si = σ2
id = 1, σ2
se = σ2
ie = 0.1, and σ2
pd = σ2
pe =
σ2
pi = 0.2.
Fig. 5. IP versus OP of the SRS and the MRS schemes for different (Pd,Pf)
with P0 = 0.8, γs ∈ [0,30 dB], N = 6, σ2
sd = σ2
si = σ2
id = 1, σ2
se = σ2
ie = 0.1, and
σ2
pd = σ2
pe = σ2
pi = 0.2.
In Fig. 5, we depict the IP versus OP of the SRS and MRS 622
schemes for different spectrum sensing reliabilities, where 623
(Pd,Pf)=( 0.9,0.1) and (Pd,Pf)=( 0.99,0.01) are considered. 624
It is observed that as the spectrum sensing reliability is im- 625
proved from (Pd,Pf)=( 0.9,0.1) to (Pd,Pf)=( 0.99,0.01),t h e 626
SRTs of the SRS and MRS schemes improve accordingly. This 627
is due to the fact that for an improved sensing reliability, an 628
unoccupied licensed band would be detected more accurately 629
and hence less mutual interference occurs between the PUs 630
and SUs, which results in a better SRT for the secondary 631
transmissions. Fig. 5 also shows that for (Pd,Pf)=( 0.9,0.1) 632
and (Pd,Pf)=( 0.99,0.01), the MRS approach outperforms the 633
SRS scheme in terms of the SRT, which further conﬁrms the ad- 634
vantage of the MRS for protecting the secondary transmissions 635
against eavesdropping attacks. 636
Fig. 6 shows the IP versus OP of the conventional direct 637
transmission as well as of the proposed SRS and MRS schemes 638
for N =2, N =4, and N =8. It is seen from Fig. 6 that the SRTs 639
Fig. 6. IP versus OP of the direct transmission, the SRS and the MRS schemes
for different N with P0 = 0.8, γs ∈ [0,30 dB], σ2
sd = σ2
si = σ2
id = 1, σ2
se = σ2
ie =
0.1, and σ2
pd = σ2
pe = σ2
pi = 0.2.
of the proposed SRS and MRS schemes are generally better 640
than that of the conventional direct transmission for N = 2, 641
N = 4 and N = 8. Moreover, as the number of SRs increases 642
from N = 2 to 8, the SRT of the SRS and MRS schemes 643
signiﬁcantly improves, explicitly demonstrating the security 644
and reliability beneﬁts of exploiting multiple SRs for assisting 645
the secondary transmissions. In other words, the security and 646
reliability of the secondary transmissions can be concurrently 647
improved by increasing the number of SRs. Additionally, as 648
shown in Fig. 6, upon increasing the number of SRs from 649
N = 2 to 8, the SRT improvement of MRS over SRS becomes 650
more notable. Again, the SRT advantage of the MRS over the 651
SRS comes at the expense of requiring elaborate symbol-level 652
synchronization among the multiple SRs for simultaneously 653
transmitting to the SD. 654
V. C ONCLUSION 655
In this paper, we proposed relay selection schemes for 656
a CR network consisting of a ST, a SD and multiple SRs 657
communicating in the presence of an eavesdropper. We ex- 658
amined the SRT performance of the SRS and MRS assisted 659
secondary transmissions in the presence of realistic spectrum 660
sensing, where both the security and reliability of secondary 661
transmissions are characterized in terms of their IP and OP, 662
respectively. We also analyzed the SRT of the conventional 663
direct transmission as a benchmark. It was illustrated that as the 664
spectrumsensingreliabilityincreases,theSRTsofboththeSRS 665
and MRS schemes improve. We also showed that the proposed 666
SRS and MRS schemes generally outperform the conventional 667
direct transmission and artiﬁcial noise based approaches in 668
terms of their SRT. Moreover, the SRT performance of MRS 669
is better than that of SRS. Additionally, as the number of SRs 670
increases, the SRTs of both the SRS and of the MRS schemes 671
improve signiﬁcantly, demonstrating their beneﬁts in terms 672
of enhancing both the security and reliability of secondary 673
transmissions. 674IEEE
Proof
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APPENDIX A 675
DERIVATION OF (45) AND (46) 676
Letting |hid|2 = xi and |hpd|2 = y, the left hand side of (45) 677
and (46) can be rewritten as Pr(max
i∈Dn
xi < Λ) and Pr(max
i∈Dn
xi < 678
Λγpy+Λ), respectively. Noting that random variables |hid|2 and 679
|hpd|2 are exponentially distributed with respective means σ2
id 680
and σ2
pd, and independent of each other, we obtain 681
Pr
 
max
i∈Dn
xi < Λ
 
= ∏
i∈Dn
Pr
 
|hid|2 < Λ
 
= ∏
i∈Dn
 
1−exp
 
−
Λ
σ2
id
  
, (A.1)
which is (45). Similarly, the term Pr(max
i∈Dn
xi <Λγpy+Λ) can be 682
computed as 683
Pr
 
max
i∈Dn
xi < Λγpy+Λ
 
=
 ∞
0
1
σ2
pd
exp
 
−
y
σ2
pd
 
∏
i∈Dn
 
1−exp
 
−
Λγpy+Λ
σ2
id
  
dy,
(A.2)
wherein ∏
i∈Dn
 
1−exp
 
−
Λγpy+Λ
σ2
id
  
can be further expanded 684
as 685
∏
i∈Dn
 
1−exp
 
−
Λγpy+Λ
σ2
id
  
= 1
+
2|Dn|−1
∑
m=1
(−1)| ˜ Dn(m)|exp
⎛
⎝− ∑
i∈ ˜ Dn(m)
Λγpy+Λ
σ2
id
⎞
⎠,
(A.3)
where |Dn| is the cardinality of set Dn, ˜ Dn(m) represents the 686
m-th non-empty subset of Dn, and | ˜ Dn(m)| is the cardinality 687
of set ˜ Dn(m). Substituting ∏
i∈Dn
 
1−exp
 
−
Λγpy+Λ
σ2
id
  
from 688
(A.3) into (A.2) yields 689
Pr
 
max
i∈Dn
xi < Λγpy+Λ
 
=
 ∞
0
1
σ2
pd
exp
 
−
y
σ2
pd
 
dy
+
2|Dn|−1
∑
m=1
(−1)| ˜ Dn(m)| 1
σ2
pd
×
 ∞
0
exp
⎛
⎝−
y
σ2
pd
− ∑
i∈ ˜ Dn(m)
Λγpy+Λ
σ2
id
⎞
⎠dy. (A.4)
Finally, performing the integration of (A.4) yields 690
Pr
 
max
i∈Dn
xi < Λγpy+Λ
 
= 1
+
2|Dn|−1
∑
m=1
(−1)| ˜ Dn(m)|exp
⎛
⎝− ∑
i∈ ˜ Dn(m)
Λ
σ2
id
⎞
⎠
×
⎛
⎝1+ ∑
i∈ ˜ Dn(m)
Λγpσ2
pd
σ2
id
⎞
⎠
−1
. (A.5)
This completes the proof of (45) and (46). 691
APPENDIX B 692
PROOF OF (49) AND (50) 693
Given D = Dn, any SR within Dn can be selected as the 694
“best” relay for forwarding the source signal. Thus, using the 695
law of total probability, we have 696
Pr
 
|hbe|2 > Λ
 
= ∑
i∈Dn
Pr
 
|hie|2 > Λ,b = i
 
= ∑
i∈Dn
Pr
 
|hie|2 > Λ,|hid|2 > max
j∈Dn−{i}
|hjd|2
 
= ∑
i∈Dn
Pr
 
|hie|2 > Λ
 
Pr
 
max
j∈Dn−{i}
|hjd|2 < |hid|2
 
, (B.1)
where in the ﬁrst line, variable ‘b’ stands for the best SR and 697
the second equality is obtained from (13) and ‘−’ represents the 698
set difference. Noting that |hie|2 is an exponentially distributed 699
random variable with a mean of σ2
ie, we obtain 700
Pr
 
|hie|2 > Λ
 
= exp
 
−
Λ
σ2
ie
 
. (B.2)
Letting |hjd|2 = xj and |hid|2 = y,w eh a v e 701
Pr
 
max
j∈Dn−{i}
|hjd|2 < |hid|2
 
=
 ∞
0
1
σ2
id
exp
 
−
y
σ2
id
 
∏
j∈Dn−{i}
 
1−exp
 
−
y
σ2
jd
  
dy, (B.3)
wherein ∏
j∈Dn−{i}
 
1−exp
 
−
y
σ2
jd
  
is expanded by 702
∏
j∈Dn−{i}
 
1−exp
 
−
y
σ2
jd
  
= 1
+
2|Dn|−1−1
∑
m=1
(−1)|Cn(m)|exp
 
− ∑
j∈Cn(m)
y
σ2
jd
 
, (B.4)
where |Dn| denotes the cardinality of the set Dn and Cn(m) 703
representsthem-thnon-emptysubsetof“Dn−{i}”.Combining 704
(B.3) and (B.4), we obtain 705
Pr
 
max
j∈Dn−{i}
|hjd|2 < |hid|2
 
= 1
+
2|Dn|−1−1
∑
m=1
(−1)|Cn(m)|
 
1+ ∑
j∈Cn(m)
σ2
id
σ2
jd
 −1
. (B.5)IEEE
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Substituting (B.2) and (B.5) into (B.1) gives (B.6), shown at 706
the bottom of the page, which is (49). Similarly to (B.1), we 707
can rewrite Pr(|hbe|2 > Λ|hpe|2γp+Λ) as 708
Pr
 
|hbe|2 > Λ|hpe|2γp+Λ
 
= ∑
i∈Dn
Pr
 
|hie|2 > Λ|hpe|2γp+Λ
 
×Pr
 
max
j∈{Dn−i}
|hjd|2 < |hid|2
 
. (B.7)
Since the random variables |hie|2 and |hpe|2 are independently 709
and exponentially distributed with respective means of σ2
ie and 710
σ2
pe, we readily arrive at 711
Pr
 
|hie|2>Λ|hpe|2γp+Λ
 
=
σ2
ie
σ2
peγpΛ+σ2
ie
exp
 
−
Λ
σ2
ie
 
. (B.8)
Substituting (B.5) and (B.8) into (B.7) gives (B.9), shown at the 712
bottom of the page, which is (50). 713
APPENDIX C 714
PROOF OF (53) AND (54) 715
Upon introducing the notation of X = ∑
i∈Dn
|hid|2 and Y = 716
|hpd|2, we can rewrite the terms Pr( ∑
i∈Dn
|hid|2 < Λ) and 717
Pr( ∑
i∈Dn
|hid|2 < γpΛ|hpd|2 + Λ) as Pr(X < Λ) and Pr(X < 718
γpΛY +Λ), respectively. Noting that the fading coefﬁcients of 719
all SR-SD channels, i.e. |hid|2 for i∈{1,2,···,N}, are assumed 720
to be i.i.d., we obtain the probability density function (PDF) of 721
X = ∑
i∈Dn
|hid|2 as 722
fX(x)=
1
Γ(|Dn|)σ
2|Dn|
d
x|Dn|−1exp
 
−
x
σ2
d
 
, (C.1)
where σ2
d = E(|hid|2). Meanwhile, the random variable Y = 723
|hpd|2 is exponentially distributed and its PDF is given by 724
fY(y)=
1
σ2
pd
exp
 
−
y
σ2
pd
 
, (C.2)
where σ2
pd = E(|hpd|2). Using (C.1), we arrive at 725
Pr(X < Λ)=
 Λ
0
1
Γ(|Dn|)σ
2|Dn|
d
x|Dn|−1exp
 
−
x
σ2
d
 
dx
=
 Λ
σ2
d
0
t|Dn|−1
Γ(|Dn|)
exp(−t)dt
=Γ
 
Λ
σ2
d
,|Dn|
 
, (C.3)
where the second equality isobtained by substituting x
σ2
d
=t and 726
Γ(a,k)=
 a
0
tk−1
Γ(k) exp(−t)dt is known as the incomplete Gamma 727
function. Additionally, considering that the random variables X 728
andY are independent of each other, we obtain Pr(X < γpΛY + 729
Λ) as 730
Pr(X < γpΛY +Λ)=
 Λ
0
fX(x)dx
+
 ∞
Λ
 ∞
x
−γpΛ− 1
γp
fX(x)fY(y)dxdy. (C.4)
Substituting fX(x) and fY(y) from (C.1) and (C.2) into (C.4) 731
yields 732
Pr(X < γpΛY +Λ)
= Γ
 
Λ
σ2
d
,|Dn|
 
+
 ∞
Λ
e
1/
 
σ2
pdγp
 
x|Dn|−1
Γ(|Dn|)σ
2|Dn|
d
exp
 
−
x
σ2
d
−
x
σ2
pdγpΛ
 
dx
= Γ
 
Λ
σ2
d
,|Dn|
 
+
 
1−Γ
 
Λσ−2
d +σ−2
pdγ−1
p ,|Dn|
  
 
1+σ2
dσ−2
pdγ−1
p Λ−1
 |Dn| e
1/
 
σ2
pdγp
 
,
(C.5)
where the second equality is obtained by using x
σ2
d
+ x
σ2
pdγpΛ =t. 733
Hence, we have completed the proof of (53) and (54) as (C.3) 734
and (C.5), respectively. 735
Pr
 
|hbe|2 > Λ
 
= ∑
i∈Dn
exp
 
−
Λ
σ2
ie
 ⎡
⎣1+
2|Dn|−1−1
∑
m=1
(−1)|Cn(m)|
 
1+ ∑
j∈Cn(m)
σ2
id
σ2
jd
 −1⎤
⎦ (B.6)
Pr
 
|hbe|2 > Λ|hpe|2γp+Λ
 
= ∑
i∈Dn
σ2
ie
σ2
peγpΛ+σ2
ie
exp
 
−
Λ
σ2
ie
 ⎡
⎣1+
2|Dn|−1−1
∑
m=1
(−1)|Cn(m)|
 
1+ ∑
j∈Cn(m)
σ2
id
σ2
jd
 −1⎤
⎦ (B.9)IEEE
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Abstract—Weconsideracognitiveradio(CR)networkconsisting 5
of a secondary transmitter (ST), a secondary destination (SD) and 6
multiplesecondaryrelays(SRs)inthepresenceofaneavesdropper, 7
where the ST transmits to the SD with the assistance of SRs, while 8
theeavesdropperattemptstointerceptthesecondarytransmission. 9
We rely on careful relay selection for protecting the ST-SD trans- 10
mission against the eavesdropper with the aid of both single-relay 11
and multi-relay selection. To be speciﬁc, only the “best” SR is cho- 12
sen in the single-relay selection for assisting the secondary trans- 13
mission, whereas the multi-relay selection invokes multiple SRs for 14
simultaneously forwarding the ST’s transmission to the SD. We 15
analyze both the intercept probability and outage probability of 16
the proposed single-relay and multi-relay selection schemes for the 17
secondary transmission relying on realistic spectrum sensing. We 18
also evaluate the performance of classic direct transmission and 19
artiﬁcial noise based methods for the purpose of comparison with 20
the proposed relay selection schemes. It is shown that as the inter- 21
cept probability requirement is relaxed, the outage performance of 22
the direct transmission, the artiﬁcial noise based and the relay se- 23
lection schemes improves, and vice versa. This implies a trade-off 24
between the security and reliability of the secondary transmission 25
in the presence of eavesdropping attacks, which is referred to as 26
the security-reliability trade-off (SRT). Furthermore, we demon- 27
strate that the SRTs of the single-relay and multi-relay selection 28
schemes are generally better than that of classic direct trans- 29
mission, explicitly demonstrating the advantage of the proposed 30
relay selection in terms of protecting the secondary transmissions 31
against eavesdropping attacks. Moreover, as the number of SRs 32
increases, the SRTs of the proposed single-relay and multi-relay 33
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selection approaches signiﬁcantly improve. Finally, our numerical 34
results show that as expected, the multi-relay selection scheme 35
achieves a better SRT performance than the single-relay selection. 36
Index Terms—Security-reliability trade-off, relay selection, 37
intercept probability, outage probability, eavesdropping attack, 38
cognitive radio. 39
I. INTRODUCTION 40
T
HE security aspects of cognitive radio (CR) systems [1]– 41
[3] have attracted increasing attention from the research 42
community. Indeed, due to the highly dynamic nature of the CR 43
network architecture, legitimate CR devices become exposed 44
to both internal as well as to external attackers and hence they 45
are extremely vulnerable to malicious behavior. For example, 46
an illegitimate user may intentionally impose interference (i.e. 47
jamming) for the sake of artiﬁcially contaminating the CR envi- 48
ronment [4]. Hence, the CR users fail to accurately characterize 49
their surrounding radio environment and may become misled 50
or compromised, which leads to a malfunction. Alternatively, 51
an illegitimate user may attempt to tap the communications of 52
authorized CR users by eavesdropping, to intercept conﬁdential 53
information. 54
Clearly, CR networks face diverse security threats during 55
both spectrum sensing [5], [6] as well as spectrum sharing [7], 56
spectrum mobility [8] and spectrum management [9]. Extensive 57
studies have been carried out for protecting CR networks both 58
against primary user emulation (PUE) [10] and against denial- 59
of-service (DoS) attacks [11]. In addition to PUE and DoS at- 60
tacks, eavesdropping is another main concern in protecting the 61
data conﬁdentiality [12], although it has received less attention 62
in the literature on CR network security. Traditionally, crypto- 63
graphic techniques are employed for guaranteeing transmission 64
conﬁdentiality against an eavesdropping attack. However, this 65
introduces a signiﬁcant computational overhead [13] as well as 66
imposing additional system complexity in terms of the secret 67
key management [14]. Furthermore, the existing cryptographic 68
approaches are not perfectly secure and can still be decrypted 69
byaneavesdropper(E),providedthatithasthecapacitytocarry 70
outexhaustivekeysearchwiththeaidofbrute-forceattack[15]. 71
Physical-layer security [16], [17] is emerging as an efﬁcient 72
approach for defending authorized users against eavesdropping 73
attacks by exploiting the physical characteristics of wireless 74
channels. In [17], Leung-Yan-Cheong and Hellman demon- 75
strated that perfectly secure and reliable transmission can be 76
achieved, when the wiretap channel spanning from the source 77
to the eavesdropper is a further degraded version of the main 78
0090-6778 © 2014 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission.
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channel between the source and destination. They also showed 79
that the maximal secrecy rate achieved at the legitimate desti- 80
nation, which is termed the secrecy capacity, is the difference 81
between the capacity of the main channel and that of the 82
wiretap channel. In [18]–[20], the secrecy capacity limits of 83
wireless fading channels were further developed and character- 84
ized from an information-theoretic perspective, demonstrating 85
the detrimental impact of wireless fading on the physical- 86
layer security. To combat the fading effects, both multiple-input 87
multiple-output (MIMO) schemes [21], [22] as well as coop- 88
erative relaying [23]–[25] and beamforming techniques [26], 89
[27] were investigated for the sake of enhancing the achievable 90
wireless secrecy capacity. Although extensive research efforts 91
were devoted to improving the security of traditional wireless 92
networks [16]–[27], less attention has been dedicated to CR 93
networks. In [28] and [29], the achievable secrecy rate of 94
the secondary transmission was investigated under a speciﬁc 95
quality-of-service (QoS) constraint imposed on the primary 96
transmission. Additionally, an overview of the physical-layer 97
security aspects of CR networks was provided in [30], where 98
several security attacks as well as the related countermeasures 99
are discussed. In contrast to conventional non-cognitive wire- 100
less networks, the physical-layer security of CR networks has to 101
consider diverse additional challenges, including the protection 102
of the primary user’s QoS and the mitigation of the mutual 103
interference between the primary and secondary transmissions. 104
Motivated by the above considerations, we explore the 105
physical-layer security of a CR network comprised of a sec- 106
ondary transmitter (ST) communicating with a secondary des- 107
tination (SD) with the aid of multiple secondary relays (SRs) 108
in the presence of an unauthorized attacker. Our main focus 109
is on investigating the security-reliability trade-off (SRT) of 110
the cognitive relay transmission in the presence of realistic 111
spectrum sensing. The notion of the SRT in wireless physical- 112
layer security was introduced and examined in [31], where the 113
security and reliability was characterized in terms of the inter- 114
cept probability and outage probability, respectively. In contrast 115
to the conventional non-cognitive wireless networks studied in 116
[31], the SRT analysis of CR networks presented in this work 117
additionally takes into account the mutual interference between 118
the primary user (PU) and secondary user (SU). 119
The main contributions of this paper are summarized as 120
follows. 121
• We propose two relay selection schemes, namely both 122
single-relay and multi-relay selection, for protecting the 123
secondary transmissions against eavesdropping attacks. 124
More speciﬁcally, in the single-relay selection (SRS) 125
scheme, only a single relay is chosen from the set of mul- 126
tiple SRs for forwarding the secondary transmissions from 127
the ST to the SD. By contrast, the multi-relay selection 128
(MRS) scheme employs multiple SRs for simultaneously 129
assisting the ST-SD transmissions. 130
• We present the mathematical SRT analysis of the proposed 131
SRS and MRS schemes in the presence of realistic spec- 132
trum sensing. Closed-form expressions are derived for the 133
intercept probability (IP) and outage probability (OP) of 134
both schemes for transmission over Rayleigh fading chan- 135
nels. The numerical SRT results of conventional direct 136
Fig. 1. A primary wireless network in coexistence with a secondary CR
network.
transmission and artiﬁcial noise based schemes are also 137
provided for comparison purposes. 138
• It is shown that as the spectrum sensing reliability is 139
increased and/or the false alarm probability is reduced, the 140
SRTs of both the SRS and MRS schemes are improved. 141
Numerical results demonstrate that the proposed SRS and 142
MRS schemes generally outperform the conventional di- 143
rect transmission and artiﬁcial noise based approaches in 144
t e r m so ft h e i rS R T s . 145
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. 146
Section II presents the system model of physical-layer security 147
in CR networks in the context of both the direct transmission as 148
well as the SRS and MRS schemes. In Section III, we analyze 149
the SRTs of these schemes in the presence of realistic spectrum 150
sensing over Rayleigh fading channels. Next, numerical SRT 151
results of the direct transmission, SRS and MRS schemes are 152
given in Section IV, where the SRT performance of the artiﬁcial 153
noise based scheme is also numerically evaluated for com- 154
parison purposes. Finally, Section V provides our concluding 155
remarks. 156
II. RELAY SELECTION AIDED PROTECTION AGAINST 157
EAVESDROPPING IN CR NETWORKS 158
We ﬁrst introduce the overall system model of physical-layer 159
security in CR networks. We then present the signal model of 160
the conventional direct transmission approach, which will serve 161
as our benchmarker, as well as of the SRS and MRS schemes 162
for improving the CR system’s security against eavesdropping 163
attacks. 164
A. System Model 165
As shown in Fig. 1, we consider a primary network in 166
coexistence with a secondary network (also referred to as a CR 167
network). The primary network includes a primary base station 168
(PBS) and multiple primary users (PUs), which communicate 169
with the PBS over the licensed spectrum. By contrast, the 170
secondary network consisting of one or more STs and SDs 171
exploits the licensed spectrum in an opportunistic way. To 172IEEE
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be speciﬁc, a particular ST should ﬁrst detect with the aid 173
of spectrum sensing whether or not the licensed spectrum is 174
occupied by the PBS. If so, the ST is not at liberty to transmit 175
to avoid interfering with the PUs. If alternatively, the licensed 176
spectrum is deemed to be unoccupied (i.e. a spectrum hole 177
is detected), then the ST may transmit to the SD over the 178
detected spectrum hole. Meanwhile, E attempts to intercept the 179
secondary transmission from the ST to the SD. For notational 180
convenience, let H0 and H1 represent the event that the licensed 181
spectrum is unoccupied and occupied by the PBS during a 182
particular time slot, respectively. Moreover, let ˆ H denote the 183
status of the licensed spectrum detected by spectrum sensing. 184
Speciﬁcally, ˆ H = H0 represents the case that the licensed 185
spectrum is deemed to be unoccupied, while ˆ H = H1 indicates 186
that the licensed spectrum is deemed to be occupied. 187
The probability Pd of correct detection of the presence of 188
PBS and the associated false alarm probability Pf are deﬁned 189
as Pd = Pr( ˆ H = H1|H1) and Pf = Pr( ˆ H = H1|H0), respectively. 190
Due to the background noise and fading effects, it is impossible 191
to achieve perfectly reliable spectrum sensing without missing 192
the detection of an active PU and without false alarm, which 193
suggests that a spectral band is occupied by a PU, when it 194
is actually unoccupied. Moreover, the missed detection of the 195
presence of PBS will result in interference between the PU 196
and SU. To guarantee that the interference imposed on the 197
PUs is below a tolerable level, both the successful detection 198
probability (SDP) Pd and false alarm probability (FAP) Pf 199
should be within a meaningful target range. For example, the 200
IEEE 802.22 standard requires Pd > 0.9 and Pf < 0.1 [2]. For 201
better protection of PUs, we consider Pd = 0.99 and Pf = 0.01, 202
unless otherwise stated. Additionally, we consider a Rayleigh 203
fading model for characterizing all the channels between any 204
twonodes ofFig.1.Finally,allthereceived signalsareassumed 205
to be corrupted by additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) 206
having a zero mean and a variance of N0. 207
B. Direct Transmission 208
Let us ﬁrst consider the conventional direct transmission 209
as a benchmark scheme. Let xp and xs denote the random 210
symbols transmitted by the PBS and the ST at a particular 211
time instance. Without loss of generality, we assume E[|xp|2]= 212
E[|xs|2]=1, where E[·] represents the expected value operator. 213
The transmit powers of the PBS and ST are denoted by Pp and 214
Ps, respectively. Given that the licensed spectrum is deemed to 215
be unoccupied by the PBS (i.e. ˆ H =H0), ST transmits its signal 216
xs at a power of Ps. Then, the signal received at the SD can be 217
written as 218
yd = hsd
√
Psxs+hpd
 
αPpxp+nd, (1)
where hsd and hpd represent the fading coefﬁcients of the 219
channel spanning from ST to SD and that from PBS to SD, 220
respectively. Furthermore, nd represents the AWGN received at 221
SD and the random variable (RV) α is deﬁned as 222
α =
 
0, H0
1, H1, (2)
where H0 represents that the licensed spectrum is unoccupied 223
by PBS and no primary signal is transmitted, leading to α = 0. 224
By contrast, H1 represents that PBS is transmitting its signal xp 225
over the licensed spectrum, thus α = 1. Meanwhile, due to the 226
broadcast nature of the wireless medium, the ST’s signal will 227
be overheard by E and the overheard signal can be expressed as 228
ye = hse
√
Psxs+hpe
 
αPpxp+ne, (3)
where hse and hpe represent the fading coefﬁcients of the 229
channel spanning from ST to E and that from PBS to E, 230
respectively, while ne represents the AWGN received at E. 231
Upon combining Shannon’s capacity formula [31] with (1), we 232
obtain the capacity of the ST-SD channel as 233
Csd = log2
 
1+
|hsd|2γs
α|hpd|2γp+1
 
, (4)
where γs =Ps/N0 and γp =Pp/N0. Similarly, the capacity of the 234
ST-E channel is obtained from (3) as 235
Cse = log2
 
1+
|hse|2γs
α|hpe|2γp+1
 
. (5)
C. Single-Relay Selection 236
In this subsection, we consider the cognitive relay network 237
of Fig. 2, where both SD and E are assumed to be beyond 238
the coverage area of the ST [24], [25], and N secondary 239
relays (SRs) are employed for assisting the cognitive ST-SD 240
transmission.Weassumethatacommon controlchannel (CCC) 241
[6] is available for coordinating the actions of the different 242
network nodes and the decode-and-forward (DF) relaying using 243
two adjacent time slots is employed. More speciﬁcally, once 244
the licensed spectrum is deemed to be unoccupied, the ST ﬁrst 245
broadcasts its signal xs to the N SRs, which attempt to decode 246
xs from their received signals. For notational convenience, let 247
D represent the set of SRs that succeed in decoding xs.G i v e n248
N SRs, there are 2N possible subsets D, thus the sample space 249
of D is formulated as 250
Ω = {/ 0,D1,D2,···,Dn,···,D2N−1}, (6)
where / 0 represents the empty set and Dn represents the n-th 251
non-empty subset of the N SRs. If the set D is empty, implying 252
that no SR decodes xs successfully, then all the SRs remain 253
silent and thus both SD and E are unable to decode xs in this 254
case. If the set D is non-empty, a speciﬁc SR is chosen from 255
D to forward its decoded signal xs to SD. Therefore, given 256
ˆ H = H0 (i.e. the licensed spectrum is deemed unoccupied), ST 257
broadcasts its signal xs to N SRs at a power of Ps a n dar a t eo f258
R. Hence, the signal received at a speciﬁc SRi is given by 259
yi = hsi
√
Psxs+hpi
 
αPpxp+ni, (7)
where hsi and hpi represent the fading coefﬁcients of the ST-SRi 260
channel and that of the PBS-SRi channel, respectively, with 261IEEE
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ni representing the AWGN at SRi. From (7), we obtain the 262
capacity of the ST-SRi channel as 263
Csi =
1
2
log2
 
1+
|hsi|2γs
α|hpi|2γp+1
 
, (8)
where the factor 1
2 arises from the fact that two orthogonal time 264
slotsarerequiredforcompletingthemessagetransmissionfrom 265
ST to SD via SRi. According to Shannon’s coding theorem, 266
if the data rate is higher than the channel capacity, the re- 267
ceiver becomes unable to successfully decode the source signal, 268
regardless of the decoding algorithm adopted. Otherwise, the 269
receiver can succeed in decoding the source signal. Thus, using 270
(8), we can describe the event of D = / 0 as 271
Csi < R, i ∈{ 1,2,···,N}. (9)
Meanwhile, the event of D =Dn is described as 272
Csi > R, i ∈Dn
Csj< R, j ∈ ¯ Dn, (10)
where ¯ Dn represents the complementary set of Dn. Without 273
loss of generality, we assume that SRi is chosen within Dn to 274
transmit its decoded result xs at a power of Ps, thus the signal 275
received at SD can be written as 276
yd = hid
√
Psxs+hpd
 
αPpxp+nd, (11)
where hid represents the fading coefﬁcient of the SRi − SD 277
channel. From (11), the capacity of the SRi −SD channel is 278
given by 279
Cid =
1
2
log2
 
1+
|hid|2γs
α|hpd|2γp+1
 
, (12)
where i ∈ Dn. In general, the speciﬁc SRi having the highest 280
instantaneous capacity to SD is chosen as the “best” SR for as- 281
sisting the ST’s transmission. Therefore, the best relay selection 282
criterion is expressed from (12) as 283
Best SR = argmax
i∈Dn
Cid = argmax
i∈Dn
|hid|2, (13)
whichshowsthatonlythechannelstateinformation(CSI)|hid|2 284
is required for performing the relay selection without the need 285
for the eavesdropper’s CSI knowledge. Upon combining (12) 286
and (13), we obtain the capacity of the channel spanning from 287
the “best” SR to SD as 288
Cbd =
1
2
log2
 
1+
γs
α|hpd|2γp+1
max
i∈Dn
|hid|2
 
, (14)
wherethesubscript‘b’inCbd denotesthebestSR.Itisobserved 289
from (14) that the legitimate transmission capacity of the SRS 290
scheme is determined by the maximum of independent random 291
variables (RVs) |hid|2 for different SRs. By contrast, one can 292
see from (4) that the capacity of classic direct transmission is 293
affected by the single RV |hsd|2.I fa l lR V s|hid|2 and |hsd|2 are 294
independent and identically distributed (i.i.d), it would be most 295
likelythat max
i∈Dn
|hid|2 ismuch higher than|hsd|2 forasufﬁciently 296
Fig. 2. A cognitive relay network consists of one ST, one SD and N SRs in
t h ep r e s e n c eo fa nE .
large number of SRs, resulting in a performance improvement 297
for the SRS scheme over the classic direct transmission. How- 298
ever, if the RVs |hid|2 and |hsd|2 are non-identically distributed 299
and the mean value of |hsd|2 is much higher than that of |hid|2, 300
then it may be more likely that max
i∈Dn
|hid|2 is smaller than |hsd|2 301
for a given number of SRs. In this extreme case, the classic 302
direct transmission may perform better than the SRS scheme. 303
It is worth mentioning that in practice, the average fading gain 304
of the SRi −SD channel, |hid|2, should not be less than that 305
of the ST-SD channel |hsd|2, since SRs are typically placed 306
in the middle between the ST and SD. Hence, a performance 307
improvement for the SRS scheme over classic direct transmis- 308
sion would be achieved in practical wireless systems. Note 309
that although a factor 1/2 in (14) is imposed on the capacity 310
of the main channel, it would not affect the performance of 311
the SRS scheme from a SRT perspective, since the capacity 312
of the wiretap channel is also multiplied by 1/2 as will be 313
shown in (16). 314
Additionally, given that the selected SR transmits its 315
decoded result xs at a power of Ps, the signal received at E is 316
expressed as 317
ye = hbe
√
Psxs+hpe
 
αPpxp+ne, (15)
where hbe and hpe represent the fading coefﬁcients of the chan- 318
nel from “best” SR to E and that from PBS to E, respectively. 319
From (15), the capacity of the channel spanning from the “best” 320
SR to E is given by 321
Cbe =
1
2
log2
 
1+
|hbe|2γs
α|hpe|2γp+1
 
, (16)
where b ∈ Dn is determined by the relay selection criterion 322
given in (13). As shown in (16), the eavesdropper’s channel 323
capacity is affected by the channel state information (CSI) 324
|hbe|2 of the wiretap channel spanning from the “best” relay to 325
the eavesdropper. However, one can see from (13) that the best 326
relay is selected from the decoding set Dn solely based on the 327
main channel’s CSI |hid|2 i.e. without taking into account the 328
eavesdropper’s CSI knowledge of |hie|2. This means that the 329
selection of the best relay aiming for maximizing the legitimate 330
transmission capacity of (14) would not lead to signiﬁcantly 331IEEE
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beneﬁcial or adverse impact on the eavesdropper’s channel 332
capacity, since the main channel and the wiretap channel are 333
independent of each other. 334
For example, if the random variables (RVs) |hie|2 related to 335
the different relays are i.i.d, we can readily infer by the law 336
of total probability that |hbe|2 has the same probability den- 337
sity function (PDF) as |hie|2, implying that the eavesdropper’s 338
channel capacity of (16) is not affected by the selection of the 339
best relay given by (13). Therefore, the SRS scheme has no 340
obvious advantage over the classic direct transmission in terms 341
of minimizing the capacity of the wiretap channel. To elaborate 342
a little further, according to the SRT trade-off, a reduction of 343
the outage probability (OP) due to the capacity enhancement 344
of the main channel achieved by using the selection of the 345
best relay would be converted into an intercept probability 346
(IP) improvement, which will be numerically illustrated in 347
Section IV. 348
D. Multi-Relay Selection 349
This subsection presents a MRS scheme, where multiple SRs 350
are employed for simultaneously forwarding the source signal 351
xs to SD. To be speciﬁc, ST ﬁrst transmits xs to N SRs over a 352
detected spectrum hole. As mentioned in Subsection II-C, we 353
denote by D the set of SRs that successfully decode xs.I fD 354
is empty, all SRs fail to decode xs and will not forward the 355
source signal, thus both SD and E are unable to decode xs.I f 356
D is non-empty (i.e. D = Dn), all SRs within Dn are utilized 357
for simultaneously transmitting xs to SD. This differs from the 358
SRS scheme, where only a single SR is chosen from Dn for 359
forwarding xs to SD. To make effective use of multiple SRs, a 360
weight vector denoted by w =[ w1,w2,···,w|Dn|]T is employed 361
at the SRs for transmitting xs, where |Dn| is the cardinality of 362
the set Dn. For the sake of a fair comparison with the SRS 363
schemeintermsofpowerconsumption,thetotaltransmitpower 364
across all SRs within Dn shall be constrained to Ps and thus the 365
weight vector w should be normalized according to  w  = 1. 366
Thus, given D =Dn and considering that all SRs within Dn are 367
selected for simultaneously transmitting xs with a weight vector 368
w, the signal received at SD is expressed as 369
ymulti
d =
√
PswTHdxs+
 
αPphpdxp+nd, (17)
whereHd =[h1d,h2d,···,h|Dn|d]T.Similarly,thesignalreceived 370
at E can be written as 371
ymulti
e =
√
PswTHexs+
 
αPphpexp+ne, (18)
where He =[ h1e,h2e,···,h|Dn|e]T. From (17) and (18), the 372
signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratios (SINRs) at SD and E 373
are, respectively, given by 374
SINRmulti
d =
γs
α|hpd|2γp+1
|wTHd|
2
, (19)
and 375
SINRmulti
e =
γs
α|hpe|2γp+1
|wTHe|
2
. (20)
In this work, the weight vector w is optimized by maximizing 376
the SINR at SD, yielding 377
max
w
SINRmulti
d , s.t.  w  = 1, (21)
where the constraint is used for normalization purposes. Using 378
the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality [32], we can readily obtain the 379
optimal weight vector wopt from (21) as 380
wopt =
H∗
d
|Hd|
, (22)
which indicates that the optimal vector design only requires the 381
SR-SD CSI Hd, whilst dispensing with the eavesdropper’s CSI 382
He. Substituting the optimal vector wopt from (22) into (19) and 383
(20) and using Shannon’s capacity formula, we can obtain the 384
channel capacities achieved at both SD and E as 385
Cmulti
d =
1
2
log2
 
1+
γs
αγp|hpd|2+1 ∑
i∈Dn
|hid|2
 
, (23)
and 386
Cmulti
e =
1
2
log2
 
1+
γs
αγp|hpe|2+1
   HH
d He
   2
|Hd|2
 
, (24)
for D = Dn, where H represents the Hermitian transpose. One 387
can observe from (14) and (23) that the difference between the 388
capacity expressions Cbd and Cmulti
d only lies in the fact that 389
the maximum of RVs |hid|2 for different SRs (i.e., max
i∈Dn
|hid|2) 390
is used for the SRS scheme, while the sum of RVs |hid|2 391
(i.e., ∑
i∈Dn
|hid|2) is employed for the MRS scheme. Clearly, 392
we have ∑
i∈Dn
|hid|2 > max
i∈Dn
|hid|2, resulting in a performance 393
gain for MRS over SRS in terms of maximizing the legitimate 394
transmission capacity. Moreover, since the main channel Hd 395
and the wiretap channel He are independent of each other, the 396
optimal weights assigned for the multiple relays based on Hd 397
will only slightly affect the eavesdropper’s channel capacity. 398
This means that the MRS and SRS schemes achieve more or 399
less the same performance in terms of the capacity of the wire- 400
tap channel. Nevertheless, given a ﬁxed outage requirement, 401
the MRS scheme can achieve a better intercept performance 402
than the SRS scheme, because according to the SRT, an outage 403
reduction achieved by the capacity enhancement of the legiti- 404
mate transmission relying on the MRS would be converted into 405
an intercept improvement. To be speciﬁc, given an enhanced 406
capacity of the legitimate transmission, we may increase the 407
data rate R based on the OP deﬁnition of (25) for maintaining 408
a ﬁxed OP, which, in turn leads to a reduction of the IP, since a 409
higher data rate would result in a lower IP, according to the IP 410
deﬁnition of (26). 411
It needs to be pointed out that in the MRS scheme, a 412
high-complexity symbol-level synchronization is required for 413
multiple distributed SRs, when simultaneously transmitting to 414
SD, whereas the SRS does not require such a complex synchro- 415
nization process. Thus, the performance improvement of MRS 416
over SRS is achieved at the cost of a higher implementation 417IEEE
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complexity. Additionally, the synchronization imperfections of 418
theMRSschemewillimposeaperformancedegradation,which 419
may even lead to a performance for the MRS scheme becoming 420
worse than that of the SRS scheme. 421
Throughout this paper, the Rayleigh model is used for char- 422
acterizing the fading amplitudes (e.g., |hsd|, |hsi|, |hid|, etc.) of 423
wireless channels, which, in turn, implies that the fading square 424
magnitudes |hsd|2, |hsi|2 and |hid|2 are exponentially distributed 425
random variables (RVs). So far, we have completed the presen- 426
tation of the signal model of the direct transmission, of the SRS, 427
and of the MRS schemes for CR networks applications in the 428
presence of eavesdropping attacks. 429
III. SRT ANALYSIS OVER RAYLEIGH FADING CHANNELS 430
This section presents the SRT analysis of the direct transmis- 431
sion, SRS and MRS schemes over Rayleigh fading channels. 432
As discussed in [31], the security and reliability are quantiﬁed 433
in terms of the IP and OP experienced by the eavesdropper and 434
destination, respectively. It is pointed out that in CR networks, 435
ST starts to transmit its signal only when an available spectrum 436
hole is detected. Similarly to [34], the OP and IP are thus 437
calculated under the condition that the licensed spectrum is 438
detected to be unoccupied by the PBS. The following gives the 439
deﬁnition of OP and IP. 440
Deﬁnition 1: Let Cd and Ce represent the channel capacities 441
achieved at the destination and eavesdropper, respectively. The 442
OP and IP are, respectively, deﬁned as 443
Pout = Pr(Cd < R| ˆ H = H0), (25)
and 444
Pint = Pr(Ce > R| ˆ H = H0), (26)
where R is the data rate. 445
A. Direct Transmission 446
Let us ﬁrst analyze the SRT performance of the conventional 447
direct transmission. Given that a spectrum hole has been de- 448
tected, the OP of direct transmission is obtained from (25) as 449
Pdirect
out = Pr(Csd < R| ˆ H = H0), (27)
whereCsd is given by (4). Using the law of total probability, we 450
can rewrite (27) as 451
Pdirect
out =Pr(Csd<R,H0| ˆ H=H0)+Pr(Csd<R,H1| ˆ H=H0), (28)
which can be further expressed as 452
Pdirect
out = Pr(Csd < R|H0, ˆ H = H0)Pr(H0| ˆ H = H0)
+Pr(Csd < R|H1, ˆ H = H0)Pr(H1| ˆ H = H0). (29)
It is shown from (2) that given H0 and H1, the parameter α is 453
obtained as α = 0 and α = 1, respectively. Thus, combining (2) 454
and (4), we have Csd = log2(1+|hsd|2γs) given H0 and Csd = 455
log2
 
1+
|hsd|2γs
|hpd|2γp+1
 
given H1. Substituting this result into (29) 456
yields 457
Pdirect
out = Pr(|hsd|2γs < 2R−1)Pr(H0| ˆ H = H0)
+Pr
 
|hsd|2γs
|hpd|2γp+1
< 2R−1
 
Pr(H1| ˆ H = H0). (30)
Moreover, the terms Pr(H0| ˆ H =H0) and Pr(H1| ˆ H =H0) can be 458
obtained by using Bayes’ theorem as 459
Pr(H0| ˆ H = H0)=
Pr( ˆ H = H0|H0)Pr(H0)
∑
i∈{0,1}
Pr( ˆ H = H0|Hi)Pr(Hi)
=
P0(1−Pf)
P0(1−Pf)+(1−P0)(1−Pd)
Δ = π0, (31)
and 460
Pr(H1| ˆ H = H0)=
(1−P0)(1−Pd)
P0(1−Pf)+(1−P0)(1−Pd)
Δ = π1, (32)
where P0 = Pr(H0) is the probability that the licensed spec- 461
trum band is unoccupied by PBS, while Pd = Pr( ˆ H = H1|H1) 462
and Pf = Pr( ˆ H = H1|H0) are the SDP and FAP, respectively. 463
For notational convenience, we introduce the shorthand π0 = 464
Pr(H0| ˆ H = H0), π1 = Pr(H1| ˆ H = H0) and Δ = 2R−1
γs . Then, 465
using (31) and (32), we rewrite (30) as 466
Pdirect
out =π0Pr
 
|hsd|2<Δ
 
+π1Pr
 
|hsd|2−|hpd|2γpΔ<Δ
 
. (33)
Noting that |hsd|2 and |hpd|2 are independently and exponen- 467
tially distributed RVs with respective means of σ2
sd and σ2
pd, 468
we obtain 469
Pr
 
|hsd|2 < Δ
 
= 1−exp
 
−
Δ
σ2
sd
 
, (34)
and 470
Pr
 
|hsd|2−|hpd|2γpΔ<Δ
 
=1−
σ2
sd
σ2
pdγpΔ+σ2
sd
exp
 
−
Δ
σ2
sd
 
. (35)
Additionally, we observe from (26) that an intercept event 471
occurs, when the capacity of the ST-E channel becomes higher 472
than the data rate. Thus, given that a spectrum hole has been de- 473
tected (i.e. ˆ H = H0), ST starts transmitting its signal to SD and 474
E may overhear the ST-SD transmission. The corresponding IP 475
is given by 476
Pdirect
int = Pr(Cse > R| ˆ H = H0), (36)
which can be further expressed as 477
Pdirect
int = Pr(Cse > R| ˆ H = H0,H0)Pr(H0| ˆ H = H0)
+Pr(Cse > R| ˆ H = H0,H1)Pr(H1| ˆ H = H0)
=π0Pr
 
|hse|2>Δ
 
+π1Pr
 
|hse|2−|hpe|2γpΔ>Δ
 
, (37)IEEE
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where the second equality is obtained by using Cse from (5). 478
Noting that RVs |hse|2 and |hpe|2 are exponentially distributed 479
and independent of each other, we can express the terms 480
Pr(|hse|2 > Δ) and Pr(|hse|2−|hpe|2γpΔ > Δ) as 481
Pr
 
|hse|2 > Δ
 
= exp
 
−
Δ
σ2
se
 
, (38)
and 482
Pr
 
|hse|2−|hpe|2γpΔ > Δ
 
=
σ2
se
σ2
peγpΔ+σ2
se
exp
 
−
Δ
σ2
se
 
, (39)
where σ2
se and σ2
pe are the expected values of RVs |hse|2 and 483
|hpe|2, respectively. 484
B. Single-Relay Selection 485
In this subsection, we present the SRT analysis of the pro- 486
posed SRS scheme. Given ˆ H = H0, the OP of the cognitive 487
transmission relying on SRS is given by 488
P
single
out = Pr(Cbd < R,D = / 0| ˆ H = H0)
+
2N−1
∑
n=1
Pr(Cbd < R,D =Dn| ˆ H = H0), (40)
where Cbd represents the capacity of the channel from the 489
“best” SR to SD. In the case of D = / 0, no SR is chosen to 490
forward the source signal, which leads to Cbd = 0f o rD = / 0. 491
Substituting this result into (40) gives 492
P
single
out = Pr(D = / 0| ˆ H = H0)
+
2N−1
∑
n=1
Pr(Cbd < R,D =Dn| ˆ H = H0). (41)
Using (2), (9), (10), and (14), we can rewrite (41) as (42), 493
shown at the bottom of the page, where Λ = 22R−1
γs . Noting 494
that |hsi|2 and |hpi|2 are independent exponentially distributed 495
random variables with respective means of σ2
si and σ2
pi,w eh a v e496
Pr
 
|hsi|2 < Λ
 
= 1−exp
 
−
Λ
σ2
si
 
, (43)
and 497
Pr
 
|hsi|2<Λ|hpi|2γp+Λ
 
=1−
σ2
si
σ2
piγpΛ+σ2
si
exp
 
−
Λ
σ2
si
 
, (44)
where the terms Pr(|hsi|2 > Λ),P r (|hsj|2 < Λ), and Pr(|hsi|2 > 498
Λ|hpi|2γp + Λ) can be similarly determined in closed-form. 499
Moreover, based on Appendix A, we obtain Pr(max
i∈Dn
|hid|2 < Λ) 500
and Pr(max
i∈Dn
|hid|2 < Λ|hpd|2γp+Λ) as 501
Pr
 
max
i∈Dn
|hid|2 < Λ
 
= ∏
i∈Dn
 
1−exp
 
−
Λ
σ2
id
  
, (45)
and 502
Pr
 
max
i∈Dn
|hid|2 < Λ|hpd|2γp+Λ
 
= 1+
2|Dn|−1
∑
m=1
(−1)| ˜ Dn(m)|exp
⎛
⎝− ∑
i∈ ˜ Dn(m)
Λ
σ2
id
⎞
⎠
×
⎛
⎝1+ ∑
i∈ ˜ Dn(m)
Λγpσ2
pd
σ2
id
⎞
⎠
−1
, (46)
where ˜ Dn(m) represents the m-th non-empty subset of Dn. 503
Additionally, the IP of the SRS scheme can be expressed as 504
P
single
int = Pr(Cbe > R,D = / 0| ˆ H = H0)
+
2N−1
∑
n=1
Pr(Cbe > R,D =Dn| ˆ H = H0), (47)
whereCbe represents the capacity of the channel spanning from 505
the “best” SR to E. Given D = / 0,w eh a v eCbe = 0, since 506
no relay is chosen for forwarding the source signal. Thus, 507
P
single
out =π0
N
∏
i=1
Pr
 
|hsi|2 < Λ
 
+π1
N
∏
i=1
Pr
 
|hsi|2 < Λ|hpi|2γp+Λ
 
+π0
2N−1
∑
n=1 ∏
i∈Dn
Pr
 
|hsi|2 > Λ
 
∏
j∈ ¯ Dn
Pr
 
|hsj|2 < Λ
 
Pr
 
max
i∈Dn
|hid|2 < Λ
 
+π1
2N−1
∑
n=1 ∏
i∈Dn
Pr
 
|hsi|2 > Λ|hpi|2γp+Λ
 
∏
j∈ ¯ Dn
Pr
 
|hsj|2 < Λ|hpj|2γp+Λ
 
×Pr
 
max
i∈Dn
|hid|2 < Λ|hpd|2γp+Λ
 
(42)IEEE
Proof
8 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON COMMUNICATIONS
substituting this result into (47) and using (2), (9), (10), and 508
(16), we arrive at 509
P
single
int =π0
2N−1
∑
n=1 ∏
i∈Dn
Pr
 
|hsi|2 > Λ
 
∏
j∈ ¯ Dn
Pr
 
|hsj|2 < Λ
 
×Pr
 
|hbe|2 > Λ
 
+π1
2N−1
∑
n=1 ∏
i∈Dn
Pr
 
|hsi|2 > Λ|hpi|2γp+Λ
 
× ∏
j∈ ¯ Dn
Pr
 
|hsj|2 < Λ|hpj|2γp+Λ
 
×Pr
 
|hbe|2 > Λ|hpe|2γp+Λ
 
, (48)
where the closed-form expressions of Pr(|hsi|2 > Λ) and 510
Pr(|hsi|2 > Λ|hpi|2γp + Λ) can be readily obtained by using 511
(43) and (44). Using the results in Appendix B, we can express 512
Pr(|hbe|2 > Λ) and Pr(|hbe|2 > Λ|hpe|2γp+Λ) as 513
Pr
 
|hbe|2 > Λ
 
= ∑
i∈Dn
exp
 
−
Λ
σ2
ie
 
×
⎡
⎣1+
2|Dn|−1−1
∑
m=1
(−1)|Cn(m)|
 
1+ ∑
j∈Cn(m)
σ2
id
σ2
jd
 −1⎤
⎦, (49)
and 514
Pr
 
|hbe|2>Λ|hpe|2γp+Λ
 
= ∑
i∈Dn
σ2
ie
σ2
peγpΛ+σ2
ie
exp
 
−
Λ
σ2
ie
 
×
⎡
⎣1+
2|Dn|−1−1
∑
m=1
(−1)|Cn(m)|
 
1+ ∑
j∈Cn(m)
σ2
id
σ2
jd
 −1⎤
⎦, (50)
where Cn(m) represents the m-th non-empty subset of Dn−{i} 515
and ‘−’ represents the set difference. 516
C. Multi-Relay Selection 517
This subsection analyzes the SRT of our MRS scheme for 518
transmission over Rayleigh fading channels. Similarly to (41), 519
the OP in this case is given by 520
Pmulti
out = Pr(D = / 0| ˆ H = H0)
+
2N−1
∑
n=1
Pr
 
Cmulti
d < R,D =Dn| ˆ H = H0
 
. (51)
Using (2), (9), (10) and (23), we can rewrite (51) as (52), shown 521
at the bottom of the page, where the closed-form expressions 522
of Pr(|hsi|2 < Λ),P r (|hsi|2 < Λ|hpi|2γp + Λ),P r (|hsi|2 > Λ), 523
Pr(|hsj|2 < Λ) and Pr(|hsi|2 > Λ|hpi|2γp +Λ) can be readily 524
derived, as shown in (43) and (44). However, it is challenging 525
to obtain the closed-form expressions of Pr( ∑
i∈Dn
|hid|2 <Λ) and 526
Pr( ∑
i∈Dn
|hid|2 < γpΛ|hpd|2+Λ). For simplicity, we assume that 527
the fading coefﬁcients of all SRs-SD channels, i.e. |hid|2 for 528
i ∈{ 1,2,···,N}, are i.i.d. RVs having the same mean (average 529
channel gain) denoted by σ2
d = E(|hid|2). This assumption is 530
widely used in the cooperative relaying literature and it is 531
valid in a statistical sense, provided that all SRs are uniformly 532
distributed over a certain geographical area. Assuming that 533
RVs of |hid|2 for i ∈ Dn are i.i.d., based on Appendix C, 534
we arrive at 535
Pr
 
∑
i∈Dn
|hid|2 < Λ
 
= Γ
 
Λ
σ2
d
,|Dn|
 
, (53)
and 536
Pr
 
∑
i∈Dn
|hid|2 < γpΛ|hpd|2+Λ
 
= Γ
 
Λ
σ2
d
,|Dn|
 
+
 
1−Γ
 
Λσ−2
d +σ−2
pdγ−1
p ,|Dn|
  
 
1+σ2
dσ−2
pdγ−1
p Λ−1
 |Dn| e
1/
 
σ2
pdγp
 
, (54)
where Γ(x,k)=
 x
0
tk−1
Γ(k)e−tdt is known as the incomplete 537
Gamma function [32]. Substituting (53) and (54) into (52) 538
yields a closed-form OP expression for the proposed MRS 539
scheme. 540
Pmulti
out =π0
N
∏
i=1
Pr
 
|hsi|2 < Λ
 
+π1
N
∏
i=1
Pr
 
|hsi|2 < Λ|hpi|2γp+Λ
 
+π0
2N−1
∑
n=1 ∏
i∈Dn
Pr
 
|hsi|2 > Λ
 
∏
j∈ ¯ Dn
Pr
 
|hsj|2 < Λ
 
Pr
 
∑
i∈Dn
|hid|2 < Λ
 
+π1
2N−1
∑
n=1 ∏
i∈Dn
Pr
 
|hsi|2 > Λ|hpi|2γp+Λ
 
∏
j∈ ¯ Dn
Pr
 
|hsj|2 < Λ|hpj|2γp+Λ
 
×Pr
 
∑
i∈Dn
|hid|2 < γpΛ|hpd|2+Λ
 
(52)IEEE
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Next, we present the IP analysis of the MRS scheme. Simi- 541
larly to (48), the IP of the MRS can be obtained from (24) as 542
Pmulti
int =π0
2N−1
∑
n=1 ∏
i∈Dn
Pr
 
|hsi|2 > Λ
 
∏
j∈ ¯ Dn
Pr
 
|hsj|2 < Λ
 
×Pr
    HH
d He
   2
|Hd|2 > Λ
 
+π1
2N−1
∑
n=1 ∏
i∈Dn
Pr
 
|hsi|2 > Λ|hpi|2γp+Λ
 
× ∏
j∈ ¯ Dn
Pr
 
|hsj|2 < Λ|hpj|2γp+Λ
 
×Pr
    HH
d He
   2
|Hd|2 > γpΛ|hpe|2+Λ
 
, (55)
where the closed-form expressions of Pr(|hsi|2 > Λ), 543
Pr(|hsj|2 < Λ),P r (|hsi|2 > Λ|hpi|2γp + Λ) and Pr(|hsj|2 < 544
Λ|hpj|2γp +Λ) may be readily derived by using (43) and (44). 545
However, it is challenging to obtain the closed-form solutions 546
for Pr
 
|HH
d He|2
|Hd|2 > Λ
 
and Pr
 
|HH
d He|2
|Hd|2 > γpΛ|hpe|2+Λ
 
. 547
Although ﬁnding a general closed-form IP expression for the 548
MRS scheme is challenging, we can obtain the numerical IP 549
results with the aid of computer simulations. 550
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS 551
In this section, we present our performance comparisons 552
among the direct transmission, the SRS and MRS schemes 553
in terms of their SRT. To be speciﬁc, the analytic IP versus 554
OP of the three schemes are obtained by plotting (33), (37), 555
(42), (48), (52), and (55). The simulated IP and OP results of 556
the three schemes are also given to verify the correctness of 557
the theoretical SRT analysis. In our computer simulations, the 558
fading amplitudes (e.g., |hsd|, |hsi|, |hid|, etc.) are ﬁrst generated 559
based on the Rayleigh distribution having different variances 560
for different channels. Then, the randomly generated fading 561
amplitudes are substituted into the deﬁnition of an outage (or 562
intercept) event, which would determine whether an outage (or 563
intercept) event occurs or not. By repeatedly achieving this pro- 564
cess, we can calculate the relative frequency of occurrence for 565
an outage (intercept) event, which is the simulated OP (or IP). 566
Additionally, the SDP Pd and FAP Pf are set to Pd = 0.99 567
and Pf = 0.01, unless otherwise stated. The primary signal- 568
to-noise ratio (SNR) of γp = 10 dB and the data rate of 569
R = 1 bit/s/Hz are used in our numerical evaluations. 570
The artiﬁcial noise based method [35], [36] is also consid- 571
ered for the purpose of numerical comparison with the relay 572
selection schemes. To be speciﬁc, in the artiﬁcial noise based 573
scheme, ST directly transmits its signal xs to SD, while N SRs 574
attempt to confuse the eavesdropper by sending an interfering 575
signal (referred to as artiﬁcial noise) that is approximately 576
designed to lie in the null-space of the legitimate main channel. 577
In this way, the artiﬁcial noise will impose interference on the 578
eavesdropper without affecting the SD. For a fair comparison, 579
the total transmit power of the desired signal xs and the artiﬁcial 580
noise are constrained to Ps. Moreover, the equal power alloca- 581
tion method [35] is used in the numerical evaluation. 582
Fig. 3. IP versus OP of the direct transmission, the SRS and the MRS schemes
for different P0 with P0 = 0.8, γs ∈ [0,35 dB], N = 6, σ2
sd = σ2
si = σ2
id = 1,
σ2
se = σ2
ie = 0.1, and σ2
pd = σ2
pe = σ2
pi = 0.2.
Fig. 3 shows the IP versus OP of the direct transmission, 583
as well as the SRS and MRS schemes for P0 = 0.8, where 584
the solid lines and discrete marker symbols represent the an- 585
alytic and simulated results, respectively. It can be seen from 586
Fig. 3 that the IP of the direct transmission, the artiﬁcial noise 587
based as well as of the proposed SRS and MRS schemes all 588
improve upon tolerating a higher OP, implying that a trade-off 589
exists between the IP (security) and the OP (reliability) of CR 590
transmissions. Fig. 3 also shows that both the proposed SRS 591
and MRS schemes outperform the direct transmission and the 592
artiﬁcial noise based approaches in terms of their SRT, showing 593
the advantage of exploiting relay selection against the eaves- 594
dropping attack. Moreover, the SRT performance of the MRS is 595
better than that of the SRS. Although the MRS achieves a better 596
SRT performance than its SRS-aided counterpart, this result 597
is obtained at the cost of a higher implementation complexity, 598
since multiple SRs require high-complexity symbol-level syn- 599
chronizationforsimultaneouslytransmittingtotheSD,whereas 600
the SRS does not require such elaborate synchronization. 601
Fig. 4 illustrates our numerical SRT comparison between the 602
SRS and MRS schemes for P0 = 0.2 and P0 = 0.8. Observe 603
from Fig. 4 that the MRS scheme performs better than the SRS 604
in terms of its SRT performance for both P0 =0.2 and P0 =0.8. 605
It is also seen from Fig. 4 that as P0 increases from 0.2 to 606
0.8, the SRT of both the SRS and MRS schemes improves. 607
This is because upon increasing P0, the licensed band becomes 608
unoccupied by the PUs with a higher probability and hence the 609
secondary users (SUs) have more opportunities for accessing 610
the licensed band for their data transmissions, which leads 611
to a reduction of the OP for CR transmissions. Meanwhile, 612
increasing P0 may simultaneously result in an increase of the IP, 613
since the eavesdropper also has more opportunities for tapping 614
the cognitive transmissions. However, in both the SRS and 615
MRS schemes, the relay selection is performed for the sake 616
of maximizing the legitimate transmission capacity without 617
affecting the eavesdropper’s channel capacity. Hence, upon 618
increasing P0, it becomes more likely that the reduction of OP 619
is more signiﬁcant than the increase of IP, hence leading to an 620
overall SRT improvement for the SRS and MRS schemes. 621IEEE
Proof
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Fig. 4. IP versus OP of the SRS and MRS schemes for different P0 with
γs ∈ [0,30 dB], N = 6, σ2
sd = σ2
si = σ2
id = 1, σ2
se = σ2
ie = 0.1, and σ2
pd = σ2
pe =
σ2
pi = 0.2.
Fig. 5. IP versus OP of the SRS and the MRS schemes for different (Pd,Pf)
with P0 = 0.8, γs ∈ [0,30 dB], N = 6, σ2
sd = σ2
si = σ2
id = 1, σ2
se = σ2
ie = 0.1, and
σ2
pd = σ2
pe = σ2
pi = 0.2.
In Fig. 5, we depict the IP versus OP of the SRS and MRS 622
schemes for different spectrum sensing reliabilities, where 623
(Pd,Pf)=( 0.9,0.1) and (Pd,Pf)=( 0.99,0.01) are considered. 624
It is observed that as the spectrum sensing reliability is im- 625
proved from (Pd,Pf)=( 0.9,0.1) to (Pd,Pf)=( 0.99,0.01),t h e 626
SRTs of the SRS and MRS schemes improve accordingly. This 627
is due to the fact that for an improved sensing reliability, an 628
unoccupied licensed band would be detected more accurately 629
and hence less mutual interference occurs between the PUs 630
and SUs, which results in a better SRT for the secondary 631
transmissions. Fig. 5 also shows that for (Pd,Pf)=( 0.9,0.1) 632
and (Pd,Pf)=( 0.99,0.01), the MRS approach outperforms the 633
SRS scheme in terms of the SRT, which further conﬁrms the ad- 634
vantage of the MRS for protecting the secondary transmissions 635
against eavesdropping attacks. 636
Fig. 6 shows the IP versus OP of the conventional direct 637
transmission as well as of the proposed SRS and MRS schemes 638
for N =2, N =4, and N =8. It is seen from Fig. 6 that the SRTs 639
Fig. 6. IP versus OP of the direct transmission, the SRS and the MRS schemes
for different N with P0 = 0.8, γs ∈ [0,30 dB], σ2
sd = σ2
si = σ2
id = 1, σ2
se = σ2
ie =
0.1, and σ2
pd = σ2
pe = σ2
pi = 0.2.
of the proposed SRS and MRS schemes are generally better 640
than that of the conventional direct transmission for N = 2, 641
N = 4 and N = 8. Moreover, as the number of SRs increases 642
from N = 2 to 8, the SRT of the SRS and MRS schemes 643
signiﬁcantly improves, explicitly demonstrating the security 644
and reliability beneﬁts of exploiting multiple SRs for assisting 645
the secondary transmissions. In other words, the security and 646
reliability of the secondary transmissions can be concurrently 647
improved by increasing the number of SRs. Additionally, as 648
shown in Fig. 6, upon increasing the number of SRs from 649
N = 2 to 8, the SRT improvement of MRS over SRS becomes 650
more notable. Again, the SRT advantage of the MRS over the 651
SRS comes at the expense of requiring elaborate symbol-level 652
synchronization among the multiple SRs for simultaneously 653
transmitting to the SD. 654
V. C ONCLUSION 655
In this paper, we proposed relay selection schemes for 656
a CR network consisting of a ST, a SD and multiple SRs 657
communicating in the presence of an eavesdropper. We ex- 658
amined the SRT performance of the SRS and MRS assisted 659
secondary transmissions in the presence of realistic spectrum 660
sensing, where both the security and reliability of secondary 661
transmissions are characterized in terms of their IP and OP, 662
respectively. We also analyzed the SRT of the conventional 663
direct transmission as a benchmark. It was illustrated that as the 664
spectrumsensingreliabilityincreases,theSRTsofboththeSRS 665
and MRS schemes improve. We also showed that the proposed 666
SRS and MRS schemes generally outperform the conventional 667
direct transmission and artiﬁcial noise based approaches in 668
terms of their SRT. Moreover, the SRT performance of MRS 669
is better than that of SRS. Additionally, as the number of SRs 670
increases, the SRTs of both the SRS and of the MRS schemes 671
improve signiﬁcantly, demonstrating their beneﬁts in terms 672
of enhancing both the security and reliability of secondary 673
transmissions. 674IEEE
Proof
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APPENDIX A 675
DERIVATION OF (45) AND (46) 676
Letting |hid|2 = xi and |hpd|2 = y, the left hand side of (45) 677
and (46) can be rewritten as Pr(max
i∈Dn
xi < Λ) and Pr(max
i∈Dn
xi < 678
Λγpy+Λ), respectively. Noting that random variables |hid|2 and 679
|hpd|2 are exponentially distributed with respective means σ2
id 680
and σ2
pd, and independent of each other, we obtain 681
Pr
 
max
i∈Dn
xi < Λ
 
= ∏
i∈Dn
Pr
 
|hid|2 < Λ
 
= ∏
i∈Dn
 
1−exp
 
−
Λ
σ2
id
  
, (A.1)
which is (45). Similarly, the term Pr(max
i∈Dn
xi <Λγpy+Λ) can be 682
computed as 683
Pr
 
max
i∈Dn
xi < Λγpy+Λ
 
=
 ∞
0
1
σ2
pd
exp
 
−
y
σ2
pd
 
∏
i∈Dn
 
1−exp
 
−
Λγpy+Λ
σ2
id
  
dy,
(A.2)
wherein ∏
i∈Dn
 
1−exp
 
−
Λγpy+Λ
σ2
id
  
can be further expanded 684
as 685
∏
i∈Dn
 
1−exp
 
−
Λγpy+Λ
σ2
id
  
= 1
+
2|Dn|−1
∑
m=1
(−1)| ˜ Dn(m)|exp
⎛
⎝− ∑
i∈ ˜ Dn(m)
Λγpy+Λ
σ2
id
⎞
⎠,
(A.3)
where |Dn| is the cardinality of set Dn, ˜ Dn(m) represents the 686
m-th non-empty subset of Dn, and | ˜ Dn(m)| is the cardinality 687
of set ˜ Dn(m). Substituting ∏
i∈Dn
 
1−exp
 
−
Λγpy+Λ
σ2
id
  
from 688
(A.3) into (A.2) yields 689
Pr
 
max
i∈Dn
xi < Λγpy+Λ
 
=
 ∞
0
1
σ2
pd
exp
 
−
y
σ2
pd
 
dy
+
2|Dn|−1
∑
m=1
(−1)| ˜ Dn(m)| 1
σ2
pd
×
 ∞
0
exp
⎛
⎝−
y
σ2
pd
− ∑
i∈ ˜ Dn(m)
Λγpy+Λ
σ2
id
⎞
⎠dy. (A.4)
Finally, performing the integration of (A.4) yields 690
Pr
 
max
i∈Dn
xi < Λγpy+Λ
 
= 1
+
2|Dn|−1
∑
m=1
(−1)| ˜ Dn(m)|exp
⎛
⎝− ∑
i∈ ˜ Dn(m)
Λ
σ2
id
⎞
⎠
×
⎛
⎝1+ ∑
i∈ ˜ Dn(m)
Λγpσ2
pd
σ2
id
⎞
⎠
−1
. (A.5)
This completes the proof of (45) and (46). 691
APPENDIX B 692
PROOF OF (49) AND (50) 693
Given D = Dn, any SR within Dn can be selected as the 694
“best” relay for forwarding the source signal. Thus, using the 695
law of total probability, we have 696
Pr
 
|hbe|2 > Λ
 
= ∑
i∈Dn
Pr
 
|hie|2 > Λ,b = i
 
= ∑
i∈Dn
Pr
 
|hie|2 > Λ,|hid|2 > max
j∈Dn−{i}
|hjd|2
 
= ∑
i∈Dn
Pr
 
|hie|2 > Λ
 
Pr
 
max
j∈Dn−{i}
|hjd|2 < |hid|2
 
, (B.1)
where in the ﬁrst line, variable ‘b’ stands for the best SR and 697
the second equality is obtained from (13) and ‘−’ represents the 698
set difference. Noting that |hie|2 is an exponentially distributed 699
random variable with a mean of σ2
ie, we obtain 700
Pr
 
|hie|2 > Λ
 
= exp
 
−
Λ
σ2
ie
 
. (B.2)
Letting |hjd|2 = xj and |hid|2 = y,w eh a v e 701
Pr
 
max
j∈Dn−{i}
|hjd|2 < |hid|2
 
=
 ∞
0
1
σ2
id
exp
 
−
y
σ2
id
 
∏
j∈Dn−{i}
 
1−exp
 
−
y
σ2
jd
  
dy, (B.3)
wherein ∏
j∈Dn−{i}
 
1−exp
 
−
y
σ2
jd
  
is expanded by 702
∏
j∈Dn−{i}
 
1−exp
 
−
y
σ2
jd
  
= 1
+
2|Dn|−1−1
∑
m=1
(−1)|Cn(m)|exp
 
− ∑
j∈Cn(m)
y
σ2
jd
 
, (B.4)
where |Dn| denotes the cardinality of the set Dn and Cn(m) 703
representsthem-thnon-emptysubsetof“Dn−{i}”.Combining 704
(B.3) and (B.4), we obtain 705
Pr
 
max
j∈Dn−{i}
|hjd|2 < |hid|2
 
= 1
+
2|Dn|−1−1
∑
m=1
(−1)|Cn(m)|
 
1+ ∑
j∈Cn(m)
σ2
id
σ2
jd
 −1
. (B.5)IEEE
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Substituting (B.2) and (B.5) into (B.1) gives (B.6), shown at 706
the bottom of the page, which is (49). Similarly to (B.1), we 707
can rewrite Pr(|hbe|2 > Λ|hpe|2γp+Λ) as 708
Pr
 
|hbe|2 > Λ|hpe|2γp+Λ
 
= ∑
i∈Dn
Pr
 
|hie|2 > Λ|hpe|2γp+Λ
 
×Pr
 
max
j∈{Dn−i}
|hjd|2 < |hid|2
 
. (B.7)
Since the random variables |hie|2 and |hpe|2 are independently 709
and exponentially distributed with respective means of σ2
ie and 710
σ2
pe, we readily arrive at 711
Pr
 
|hie|2>Λ|hpe|2γp+Λ
 
=
σ2
ie
σ2
peγpΛ+σ2
ie
exp
 
−
Λ
σ2
ie
 
. (B.8)
Substituting (B.5) and (B.8) into (B.7) gives (B.9), shown at the 712
bottom of the page, which is (50). 713
APPENDIX C 714
PROOF OF (53) AND (54) 715
Upon introducing the notation of X = ∑
i∈Dn
|hid|2 and Y = 716
|hpd|2, we can rewrite the terms Pr( ∑
i∈Dn
|hid|2 < Λ) and 717
Pr( ∑
i∈Dn
|hid|2 < γpΛ|hpd|2 + Λ) as Pr(X < Λ) and Pr(X < 718
γpΛY +Λ), respectively. Noting that the fading coefﬁcients of 719
all SR-SD channels, i.e. |hid|2 for i∈{1,2,···,N}, are assumed 720
to be i.i.d., we obtain the probability density function (PDF) of 721
X = ∑
i∈Dn
|hid|2 as 722
fX(x)=
1
Γ(|Dn|)σ
2|Dn|
d
x|Dn|−1exp
 
−
x
σ2
d
 
, (C.1)
where σ2
d = E(|hid|2). Meanwhile, the random variable Y = 723
|hpd|2 is exponentially distributed and its PDF is given by 724
fY(y)=
1
σ2
pd
exp
 
−
y
σ2
pd
 
, (C.2)
where σ2
pd = E(|hpd|2). Using (C.1), we arrive at 725
Pr(X < Λ)=
 Λ
0
1
Γ(|Dn|)σ
2|Dn|
d
x|Dn|−1exp
 
−
x
σ2
d
 
dx
=
 Λ
σ2
d
0
t|Dn|−1
Γ(|Dn|)
exp(−t)dt
=Γ
 
Λ
σ2
d
,|Dn|
 
, (C.3)
where the second equality isobtained by substituting x
σ2
d
=t and 726
Γ(a,k)=
 a
0
tk−1
Γ(k) exp(−t)dt is known as the incomplete Gamma 727
function. Additionally, considering that the random variables X 728
andY are independent of each other, we obtain Pr(X < γpΛY + 729
Λ) as 730
Pr(X < γpΛY +Λ)=
 Λ
0
fX(x)dx
+
 ∞
Λ
 ∞
x
−γpΛ− 1
γp
fX(x)fY(y)dxdy. (C.4)
Substituting fX(x) and fY(y) from (C.1) and (C.2) into (C.4) 731
yields 732
Pr(X < γpΛY +Λ)
= Γ
 
Λ
σ2
d
,|Dn|
 
+
 ∞
Λ
e
1/
 
σ2
pdγp
 
x|Dn|−1
Γ(|Dn|)σ
2|Dn|
d
exp
 
−
x
σ2
d
−
x
σ2
pdγpΛ
 
dx
= Γ
 
Λ
σ2
d
,|Dn|
 
+
 
1−Γ
 
Λσ−2
d +σ−2
pdγ−1
p ,|Dn|
  
 
1+σ2
dσ−2
pdγ−1
p Λ−1
 |Dn| e
1/
 
σ2
pdγp
 
,
(C.5)
where the second equality is obtained by using x
σ2
d
+ x
σ2
pdγpΛ =t. 733
Hence, we have completed the proof of (53) and (54) as (C.3) 734
and (C.5), respectively. 735
Pr
 
|hbe|2 > Λ
 
= ∑
i∈Dn
exp
 
−
Λ
σ2
ie
 ⎡
⎣1+
2|Dn|−1−1
∑
m=1
(−1)|Cn(m)|
 
1+ ∑
j∈Cn(m)
σ2
id
σ2
jd
 −1⎤
⎦ (B.6)
Pr
 
|hbe|2 > Λ|hpe|2γp+Λ
 
= ∑
i∈Dn
σ2
ie
σ2
peγpΛ+σ2
ie
exp
 
−
Λ
σ2
ie
 ⎡
⎣1+
2|Dn|−1−1
∑
m=1
(−1)|Cn(m)|
 
1+ ∑
j∈Cn(m)
σ2
id
σ2
jd
 −1⎤
⎦ (B.9)IEEE
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